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ABSTRACT
University Name: The American University in Cairo

Thesis Title: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia:
The Cases of India and Israel

Student Full Name: Kareem Mahmoud Kamel

Name of Advisor: Dr. William De Mars

Name of Readers: Dr. Anthony Lang & Dr. Bahgat Korany

This research attempts to offer a multivariate explanation for the decisions of Israel
and India to build nuclear weapons and deploy them, and their choice of nuclear strategy by
‘theorizing’ the largely descriptive but undertheorized literature on the topic. It focuses on the
formative period of each country’s nuclear program during which time its nuclear program
was set on track.
The major aim of the work is to open the ‘black box’ of nuclear politics and shed light
on the anomalies in the nuclear decisions of both countries, that are not adequately addressed
by the security model and its accompanying principles of state rationality. This thesis will
argue that while the nuclear decisions of both countries have been, no doubt, shaped by its
strategic threat perceptions, two other variables played, to different degrees, an important role
in nuclear proliferation: the attitudinal prisms of its chief nuclear decision-makers in relation
to their perceptions of ‘national interest’, ‘science’, ‘modernity’ and ‘prestige’ and chief
bureaucrats residing over key scientific establishments. In order to account for the reasons
behind key nuclear decisions, three theoretical models were used: the security perspective
with its focus on strategic threat perceptions, the cognitive approach to decision-making with
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its emphasis on the attitudinal prisms of decision-makers, and the bureaucratic approach with
its ability to account for the pulling and hauling that is characteristic of bureaucratic politics.
Finally, the thesis comparatively evaluated the Israeli and Indian cases of proliferation
and related them to other cases of proliferation and non-proliferation in the third world.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Most analysis of Cold War nuclear policy, and of proliferation, rely almost
exclusively on the security model of state rationality. This explanation assumes that
states act as coherent units in their relentless pursuit of power (defined largely in
material terms) amidst an anarchic international environment. In this regard, nuclear
weapons are seen as facilitators of much-needed security. In other words, “many U.S.
policymakers and most international relations scholars have a clear and simple answer
to the proliferation puzzle: states will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they
face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through
alternative means: if they do not face such threats, they will willingly remain nonnuclear states.”1
This thesis will examine the decisions of India and Israel to build nuclear
weapons and deploy them, and their choice of nuclear strategy. Moreover, it will
focus on nuclear decision-making in both countries. A closer look at each of the two
countries reveals anomalies in their nuclear decisions that are not well-explained by
the security model. First, the nuclear programs of India and Israel have been shaped
by the “attitudinal prisms” of their chief nuclear decision-makers and their different
perceptions of ‘national interest’. Secondly, nuclear politics in both countries involved
important “normative” concerns. Of particular importance, is the interaction between

1

Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons ?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,”

International Security

21 (Winter 1996/1997): 54.

1

‘science’ and ‘prestige’, as important normative constructs, and how they were
understood by nuclear decision-makers in relationship to perceptions of modernity
and identity. Third, nuclear decisions were pioneered by chief bureaucrats residing
over an extensive nuclear bureaucracy. In other words, nuclear decision-making
largely involved pulling and hauling between bureaucrats whose interests and
perceptions were largely shaped by personal and partisan interests.
India and Israel invite analysis because they have the longest nuclear history in
the developing world, and their democratic systems, however flawed, yield relatively
greater information on domestic decision-making. More specifically, it will enable
one to better understand the “attitudinal prism” of key decision-makers, bureaucratic
politics and important “normative” concerns that played a role in nuclear decisionmaking. This is not to say that authoritarian regimes lack the previous attributes, but
rather a realization that the nature of democratic governments makes it easier to
obtain information on a sensitive issue that is already concealed by multiple veils of
secrecy. Hence, the democratic systems of both India and Israel enable one to better
understand the domestic dimension of decision-making that would have otherwise
been further obscured by personalized politics, authoritarian regimes, extremely rigid
censorship and lack of informative publications pertaining to the subject-matter of the
thesis.
The main problem in proliferation studies lies in the lack of analytical
appreciation of the complexity of nuclear politics, the reasons behind key strategic
decisions, and the range of reasons why states choose to go nuclear. More
importantly, an exclusive reliance on the security model for understanding
proliferation is called into question by recent literature recognizing the important role

2

that domestic factors and normative concerns play in nuclear decision-making. Scott
Sagan contends that “the consensus view, focusing on national security considerations
as the cause of proliferation, is dangerously inadequate because nuclear weapons
programs also serve other, more parochial and less obvious objectives.”2 Chellaney
captures the problem of nonproliferation theory when he argues that the
“understanding of the incentives and disincentives to proliferation, and formulation of
anti-proliferation strategies, have been handicapped by the analytical straightjacket in
which developments have been viewed by nonproliferation scholars and
policymakers…..The nonproliferation literature has major shortcomings. Much of the
literature analyzes proliferation in relation to threat perceptions and national security
concerns, and views nuclear weapons mainly in military terms.”3 Hence, the security
explanation is seen as producing a sort of “black box” or “billiard ball” concept of
national actors by “eschewing any empirical concern with domestic and internal
variations within the separate nations.”4
Furthermore, the security explanation is quite elusive and is further obscured
by the fact that “a large number of ‘insecure’ countries do not turn to nuclear force for
their security. On the other hand, if we consider the concept of security broadly, every
country that has gone nuclear has faced some security problem.”5 Hence, national
2

Ibid., 55.

3

Brahma Chellaney, “South Asia’s Passage to Nuclear Power,” International Security 16 (Summer
1991): 44.
4

J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14
(October 1961): 81.
5

Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies
(Spring/Summer 1993): 196.

3

2

‘insecurity’ seems to be a necessary but insufficient cause for nuclear proliferation to
occur.
In order to understand the reasons for nuclear proliferation among Third
World states, one must not only appreciate the unique security threats that make Third
World states ‘insecure’, but also the ways in which their domestic decision-making
processes interact with their threat environment. Such an approach allows one to
conceptually appreciate the causal link between domestic and international
environments and that they are both important in determining nuclear decisions.
James Rosenau characterized the conceptual difficulties in such a process when he
maintained: “No less sturdy and protective is the conceptual jail that students of
comparative and national politics have built for themselves…..By regarding every
national system as acting to enhance or preserve its basic interests, however these may
be defined or from wherever they may come, the foreign policy analyst can focus on
the international actions themselves and is relieved of having to treat them as
responses to various internal sources as well as to external stimuli.”6
This thesis will draw on the relatively extensive and increasingly growing
historical and policy/descriptive literature on India and Israel, reanalyzing and
reformulating information in a systematic way in order to test the limits of what can
be explained by the security model. The anomalies which cannot be explained by such
a model, will be isolated and explained using theoretical tools that illustrate individual

6

James N. Rosenau, “Introduction: Political Science in a Shrinking World,” in Linkage Politics:

Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems ed. James N. Rosenau (New York:
The Free Press, 1969), 9.

4

and bureaucratic decision-making and important normative symbols of ‘science’ and
‘prestige’.
Historical Background
During the Cold War, the Third World has largely been characterized by
“gradual militarization, violent conflict, interstate arms transfers, massive military

developments.”7 In addition, the developing countries have witnessed a continuos
upward spiral in military spending.8 The end of the Cold War highlighted the
necessity of a sharper focus on Third World security concerns that were often
overridden by superpower conflicts and the resulting struggle over spheres of
influence in the Third World. In fact, it has been argued that during the Cold War,
“great power conflicts [were] exported to the Third World, whether as wars by proxy
or as exacerbation of indigenous Third World conflicts.”9 Moreover, Third World
security concerns were most often seen as derivative of the more encompassing
bipolar conflict. The end of the Cold War necessitated more attention be given to
Third World states and their respective concerns which were neglected during the
years of the bipolar conflict.
The Arab-Israeli and the Indo-Pakistani conflicts are both examples of major
protracted Third World conflicts. The seriousness of those regional conflicts could be

7

Yazid Sayegh, “Security in the Developing Countries,” in International Politics: Enduring Concepts
and Contemporary Issues ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Harper Collins, 1992) , 220.
8

Ibid., 221.

9

Mohammed Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” in Managing Global Chaos:
Sources of and Responses to International Conflict ed. Chester Crocker et al. (Washington D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) , 37.
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illustrated if one recognizes that they have lead to colossal human and material costs
and show little prospect of being resolved in the near future. The seriousness of Third
World conflicts could be illustrated when one notes that according to some CIA
accounts, the 1990 Indo-Pakistani crisis over Kashmir was the closest that the world
has ever come to an actual nuclear exchange.10 Richard Kerr, deputy director of the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency at the time of the crisis, mentioned that “it was far
more frightening than the Cuban Missile Crisis”.11 The human costs of Third World
conflicts, could be appreciated if one recognizes that the 1947 Indo-Pakistani war
alone left one million people dead and created ten million refugees.12 In terms of the
material cost of protracted Third World conflicts, it is important to note that the
Middle East has been the largest arms purchaser in the world during the 1970s and
1980s.13 The cumulative value of arms transfers to twenty states in the Middle East
between 1982 and 1986 was equivalent to 43.5% of total arms exports. 14 This means
that a significant portion of resources that should have been allocated to economic,
political and social development, have been used for arms purchasing. More recently,
the increased prospects of nuclear exchange in both the Middle East and South Asia
in light of the increasing nuclear capabilities of many regional actors, illustrates the
10

David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, “Elite Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy in India,”
Asian Survey 36 (June 1996) : 545.
11

12

Ibid.
Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affairs 77 (September/October 1998) : 45.

13

Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, “The Global System and Arab Foreign Policies: The
Primacy of Constraints,” in The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change ed. Bahgat
Korany et al. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1991) , 38.
14

Ibid., 39.
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seriousness of protracted Third World conflicts. It is estimated that India has a
stockpile of about 370 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, enough to make
roughly 75 nuclear weapons; and Pakistan has amassed some 210 kilograms, enough
for roughly 10 nuclear weapons.15 In the Middle East, Israel is projected to possess as
many as 200 nuclear devices.16 This has prompted many Arab and Muslim states such
as Libya, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Algeria to seek nuclear technology and attempt to
become nuclear capable. This has increased the specter of a nuclear arms race and
even nuclear exchange should members of those two volatile regions engage in armed
conflict.
Unlike other Third World states, the nuclear concerns of India and Israel are not
recent but both countries have a long history of nuclear decision-making and welldeveloped nuclear programs. Amitabh Mattoo argues that with the death of Mahatma
Ghandi and his idealist tradition of non-violence, there was a gradual erosion of
India’s moral commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.17 Moreover, India’s Atomic
Energy Commission was set up in 1948 (just a year after its independence) and India
conducted its first nuclear test at Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert in 1974. In the case
of Israel, Avner Cohen argues that Israel is the sixth nation in the world and the first
in the Middle East to acquire nuclear weapons.18 Moreover, he maintains that Israel
15

Jurgen Wouters, “Asia’s Cold War Heats Up,” ABC News http://www.abcnews.com

16

Leonard S. Spector, “Israel Introduced Nuclear Weapons to the Middle East,” in Nuclear
Proliferation: Opposing Viewpoints ed. Charles P. Cozic et al. (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1992) ,
127.
17

18

Amitabh Mattoo, “India’s Nuclear Status Quo,” Survival 38 (Autumn 1996): 54.
Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) , 1.
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completed the development stage of its first nuclear weapon in 1966-67 and on the
eve of the June 1967 War, it “already had a rudimentary, nuclear weapons
capability.”19

Research Objectives
In light of this background, it becomes rather important to study the reasons for
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia. More specifically, the aims
of the research will be threefold. First, it will examine the rationale behind the
decision of India and Israel to build nuclear weapons. This thesis will argue that many
factors have shaped nuclear decision-making in both countries. In the absence of any
one of those factors, the nuclear program of both India and Israel might have not been
initiated or might have taken a different course. As has been previously mentioned,
the main problem in proliferation literature has been the exclusive reliance on the
security explanation for nuclear decisions. Also, in most cases, historical and
policy/descriptive research on the Indian and Israeli nuclear programs has been
illuminating, informative and detailed, but undertheorized.20 Very little effort has
been spent on theorization or rigorous conceptualization. In order to remedy the
previously mentioned deficiencies and for analytical and conceptual purposes, this
research will employ two other decision-making models in order to explain
phenomena which cannot be explained by the “security” model:
19

20

Ibid.
Examples of brilliantly informative but undertheorized literature are: Avner Cohen, Israel and the

Bomb (New York: Columbia UP, 1998) ; Taysir N. Nashif , Nuclear Weapons in Israel (New Delhi:
S.B. Nangia, 1996) ; David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, eds. India and the Bomb: Public Opinion
and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).
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The Cognitive approach to decision-making – including
“normative concerns” in relation to attitudinal prisms/worldviews
of individual decision-makers.



Bureaucratic politics.
The current research will also examine the nuclear strategies and nuclear
postures of both countries as they relate to each country’s threat perceptions.
Important strategies that will be examined will be compellence, deterrence, warmaking, or using nuclear weapons to secure political benefits in negotiations. In terms
of nuclear postures, opaque and overt nuclear posturing will be examined.
In its concluding section, the research will comparatively evaluate the Indian
and Israeli nuclear programs. In addition, it should shed some light on more general
Third World nuclear issues and try to briefly examine some important similarities and
differences between the Indian and Israeli cases, on the one hand, and other regional
or third world cases of nuclear proliferation or non-proliferation, on the other. By
focusing on two states with a long tradition of nuclear decision-making, one could
capture the depth of the decision-making process and understand the subtleties of
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia. This does not mean that the
concerns of India and Israel are necessarily identical to that of other Third World
states or of their regional counterparts. However, by focusing on India and Israel, one
could draw comparisons between and among the developing countries of the world in
terms of their nuclear decision-making processes and security concerns. This
comparative perspective would not have been possible had one focused on the nuclear
decision-making and nuclear strategies of only one country.

9

Theoretical Framework
Within the rather large and complex debate on nuclear proliferation, there are
various arguments that directly touch on the subject-matter of this thesis.
Nevertheless, due to the complexity and multidimensionality of those arguments, only
the major strands will be presented in this theoretical framework.
The research problem derives itself from the researcher’s realization of the
deficiencies inherent in the literature on nuclear decision-making and nuclear
proliferation in the Third World. In fact, the several existing schools of theoretical
literature on nuclear proliferation and nuclear strategy suffer from an overemphasis on
the security model of explaining proliferation. On the other hand, a descriptive
literature exists on Indian and Israeli nuclear decision-making, which provides rich
empirical material but is undertheorized. Hence, one of the main aims of this thesis
will be to reformulate and theorize this descriptive material using several key
approaches from decision-making theory.
There have been various approaches to nuclear decision-making and nuclear
proliferation. In the post-Cold War period and due to the predominance of American
proliferation literature, there is a tendency to examine Third World nuclear
proliferation from a US perspective. This perspective exhibits an inherent
predisposition to misunderstand or downplay Third World security concerns and
ambitions. On the other hand, the “Cold War nuclear debate” is useful in
understanding the reasons for nuclear proliferation, yet it is derived solely from the
bipolar experience which might significantly differ from that of the Third World. The
“Third World perspective” criticizes both superpowers for failing to understand the
unique strategic and geopolitical environment in which Third World states survive

11

and requests that more attention be given to issues that are specific to the Third
World. However, all of the previously mentioned approaches share a recurrent
tendency to analyze nuclear politics in terms of national security threats and neorealist
concerns. Such a depiction of nuclear politics obscures our understanding of the
process of nuclear decision-making – a process which evidently takes place on many
levels as opposed to only one level, the level of the nation-state.
As a result, there seems to be a need for the reevaluation of those previous
approaches in a more nuanced fashion in order to arrive at a more comprehensive
analysis and understanding of nuclear politics. This section attempts to summarize the
main ideas presented in those three conceptual models and then focus on the decisionmaking models that will be employed in this thesis.

Strategic Literature
The Cold War Nuclear Debate:
The traditional “Cold War nuclear debate” provides one with useful insights
pertaining to the dynamics of nuclear proliferation. The debate was largely embedded
in the historical experience of the bipolar struggle. One strand of the debate focused
on the subtleties of nuclear deterrence within the framework of the Cold War and
given the nature of the bipolar struggle. Within this framework, the majority of the
literature suggests that states are dissuaded from engaging in conflict due to the
nuclear risk that looms large. In other words, Cold War deterrence theorists generally
argue that “since war between nuclear-armed adversaries involves the possibility of
reciprocal destruction, even annihilation, the prospects for a stable deterrent
relationship between them…..are alleged to be much greater than in a non-nuclear

11

world.”21 Kenneth Waltz asserts that “nuclear weapons are in fact a tremendous force
for peace and afford nations that possess them the possibility of security at reasonable
cost”.22 Robert Jervis sees that “nuclear war-fighting” is not a possibility and argues
that “mutually assured destruction exists as a fact, irrespective of policy…..No
amount of flexibility no degree of military superiority at levels less than an all-out
war, can change the fundamental attribute of the nuclear age….Not only can each side
destroy the other if it chooses to, but that outcome can grow out of conflict even if no
one wants it to.”23
Even after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, there
emerged a general perception among international relations scholars that the
possession of nuclear weapons by both superpowers had induced restraint and greatly
prevented the escalation of superpower conflicts during the Cold War years. This kind
of bipolar “stability” stemmed largely from the superpower realization of the extreme
and quick devastation brought about by nuclear weapons and the annihilating prospect
of “mutual kill.”24 In other words, there seemed to be a near consensus on the fact that
“the very existence of nuclear stockpiles has created and enforced a considerable
caution in the relations among nuclear-weapon states, so that where the very interests
21

David Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security 21
(Winter 1996/1997) : 90.
22

Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84
(September 1990) : 731.
23

Robert Jervis, “Escalation Dominance and Competition in Risk-Taking,” in The Use of Force ed.
Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz (Maryland: Maryland UP, 1998) , 408.
24

Robert Jervis, “The Utility of Nuclear Deterrence,” in International Politics: Enduring Concepts
and Contemporary Issues ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Harper Collins, 1992) , 204.
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of those states are clear and their political and military engagement manifest, as with
the Soviet Union and the United States in Eastern and Western Europe respectively,
there is an intrinsic inhibition on adventure.”25
Another strand of the “Cold War nuclear debate” focuses more on ‘warfighting’ as opposed to ‘deterrence’. With the development of small-yield short-range
tactical nuclear weapons, some deterrence theorists argued that nuclear weapons
could be used in this limited form. Robert Oppenheimer stressed the importance of
changing nuclear strategy from that of “mass destruction” to one in which tactical
weapons would be a possibility.26 In his view, that would mean bringing “battle back
to the battlefield.”27. The possibility of nuclear war, which loomed large during the
Cold War, led some theorists to even argue that the superpowers must prepare
themselves for “nuclear-war fighting” rather than only limit themselves to nuclear
deterrence. Colin Gray argues that “coming to terms with the enduring facts of the
nuclear age should mean more than focusing near-exclusively upon the deterrence of
war; it should also mean thinking about it, and planning carefully for the conduct of
nuclear war.”28 However, both strands of the “Cold War nuclear debate” focused
mainly on

“systemic” dynamics within the bipolar conflict and viewed nuclear

25

McGeorge Bundy, “The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy,” in International Politics:
Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Harper
Collins, 1992) , 211.
26

Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in Makers of Modern
Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986) , 746.
27

Ibid.

28

Colin Gray, “War Fighting for Deterrence,” in The Use of Force ed. Robert J . Art and Kenneth
Waltz (Maryland: Maryland UP, 1998) , 364.
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decision-making as a function of national security concerns derived from strict
“neorealist” calculations such as deterrence and war-fighting.

The American Non-Proliferation Consensus:
From the point of view of the United States in the post-Cold War period, the
main problem lies in the worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons. In fact, since
1990, there seems to be a strong consensus between the policy statements of the U.S.
government and most academic analysts on the importance of nuclear nonproliferation. The Clinton Administration concluded that “the spread of weapons of
mass destruction posed the most direct threat to U.S. post-Cold War security
interests.”29 U.S Defense Secretary, William Perry, warned that the danger of a ‘rogue
nation’ acquiring nuclear arms was “one of the most serious threats facing the world
today.”30 Also, there has been a general perception among many academics that “the
major military threat facing the United States in the post-Soviet world is not a
particular country but a trend: nuclear proliferation.”31 George Perkovich has warned
that the primary threat of nuclear war is “no longer from conflict in Central Europe
but from conflict in Asia – the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Korean peninsula,
and the South Asian subcontinent.”32

29

30

Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism,” 87.
Ibid., 88.

31

Michael Mandelbaum, “Lessons of the Next Nuclear War,” in Foreign Affairs: Agenda 1996 (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996) , 205.
32

George Perkovich, “A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia,” Foreign Policy No.91 (Summer 1993):

85
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The United States seeks to establish total disarmament of nuclear weapons and
to prevent “rogue” states in particular from becoming nuclear capable. Despite this
apparently benign goal, the focus on “horizontal” proliferation as opposed to the
“vertical” proliferation of superpower strategic weapons could be seen as unjust and
largely “colored by the parochial perceptions of U.S. strategic interests.”33 In addition,
if the United States succeeds in its declared ambitions of nuclear non-proliferation, it
would be able to more easily police the international seas and intervene in regional
conflicts without incurring significant military and political costs. As such, the United
States, while continuing to maintain its own nuclear capabilities, continues to pursue
its declared goal of worldwide non-proliferation with almost total disregard for the
security concerns of many actors in Third World regional systems.

The Third World Perspective:
The Third World national security literature has criticized the American
Perspective on nuclear weapons and has sought to remedy the deficiencies of the
“Cold War nuclear debate” by focusing on important Third World security concerns
that are/were not addressed by the previously mentioned perspectives. More
specifically, it sought to account for the more specific concerns and issues that are
characteristic of nuclear proliferation in the Third World. Those issues and concerns
might set the Third World experience apart, in many significant ways, from the
bipolar one. However, The “Third World perspective” also looks at nuclear politics

33

Chellaney, “South Asia’s Passage,” 47.
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through the realist prism discussing traditional strategic and geopolitical issues of
‘high politics’ and does not attempt to open further the “black-box” of nuclear
decision-making.
Many authors arguing from the “Third World perspective” suggest that the
Cold War peace was facilitated by the unique strategic and geopolitical character of
the Cold War. David Karl argues that “the territorial separation of the
superpowers…..the status-quo orientation of their leaderships, coupled with the
simplicity of the bipolar rivalry, made for a uniquely benign security environment
with redundant sources of stability.”34 He contends that in the case of the Third
World, conflict has usually been among traditional enemies in close proximity, and at
the same time conflict is endemic and quickly comes to engage critical interests.35 As
such, conflict in the Third World is seen as having a higher potential to escalate and
therefore the threat of nuclear exchange is increased. Another important difference
that is often attributed solely to the Third World, is the lack of congruence between
regional states’ perception of their own legitimate political role in a region and the
role they attribute to other regional powers.36 This is exemplified in the case of India
and its desire to become the regional hegemon and Pakistan’s refusal to accord it that
regional role and its attempt to thwart its regional aspirations. Also, the hegemonic
position that Israel accords itself is rejected by its larger neighbors like Egypt, Iraq,
34
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Iran and Syria who feel that they are entitled to the position of regional hegemon.
According to Mohammed Ayoob, this problem did not exist in Europe during the last
five decades, especially in Western Europe vis-à-vis West Germany, due to the direct
strategic presence of the superpowers in Europe and the latter’s near-total integration
into the two major global alliance networks.37
The motives of the United States in pursuing global non-proliferation have
sparked tremendous criticism on the part of many Third World scholars. Some have
pointed out that US policy makes an implicit but rather ethnocentric proposition to the
effect that “only the states of the North can act in a responsible manner.”38 Brahma
Chellaney contends that the United States continues to pursue its own self-interest and
seeks to prevent regional hegemons from acquiring nuclear weapons so that it would
be able to expand its influence in the Third World unchallenged.39 In addition,
Chellaney argues that the United States fails to understand the dynamics of
nuclearization and incentives for military buildups in South Asia.40 Furthermore,
some have mentioned that India’s nuclear program is partly aimed at staving off
“American hegemonism” in addition of course to deterring Chinese and Pakistani
threats to its national security.41 Moreover, Jaswant Singh, the Senior Adviser on
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Defense and Foreign Affairs to Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, argues
that the superpowers have failed to address the security concerns of India which
ultimately forced that country to seek nuclear weapons.42

He contends that the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) “was neither comprehensive nor related to
disarmament but rather devoted to ratifying the nuclear status quo….[and therefore]
India’s options had narrowed critically.”43 Also, some have argued that the situation
in the Middle East is different from that of South Asia, since Israel’s nuclear
monopoly creates a more unstable situation in the former as opposed to the more
balanced and stable situation in the latter.44 For many Third World scholars, the
policy of the United States aimed at mainly curbing so-called Middle Eastern “rogue”
states from becoming nuclear capable might have in fact exacerbated the instability of
the Middle East through this dynamic of selective proliferation. As such, many have
pointed to the biases inherent in US nonproliferation policies and the inability of the
United States to understand regional dynamics and address Third World security
concerns.
Despite the innovative style of the “Third World perspective” and its many
useful insights, it has often dealt with nuclear proliferation in the Third World either
in a very “general” way that deals with the phenomena in its entirety, and/or on a
strict regional or country-by-country basis without an in-depth comparative analysis.
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As has been stated above, all of the previously mentioned approaches have tended to
obscure decision-making dynamics occurring within nation-states and have neglected
the importance of interregional and interstate comparisons. Thus, this research will
focus on nuclear decision-making in India and Israel and, in its concluding section, it
will attempt to address important interregional and interstate issues. This analysis
recognizes the utility of previous approaches to the study of nuclear proliferation but
engages in a selective and careful process of reanalyzing and reformulating previous
arguments with the purposes of understanding the subtleties of nuclear proliferation
and decision-making in both India and Israel: two countries existing in two volatile
regions of the world.

The Security Perspective and Decision-Making Theory
Due to the largely “secretive” nature of nuclear decisions and the absence of
intricate, detailed information pertaining to nuclear decision-making, one should not
be expected to establish a rigid theoretical framework and undertake a rigorous
analysis of decision-making as one would be able to perform on other occasions.45
However, this does not mean that available evidence cannot be isolated and studied
within a coherent, well-organized theoretical framework that would enable one to, at
least, categorize the many factors that played an important role in nuclear decisionmaking in India and Israel. Thus, within the limits of available material, a coherent
study of nuclear decision-making is possible.
45
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The declared goals of the thesis entail that a multidimensional theoretical
approach be adopted for a comprehensive analysis to be undertaken. Moreover, such
an endeavor requires that multiple levels of analysis be used in order to enhance the
“explanatory power” of the research. This mainly stems from the researcher’s
realization that previous analyses of the reasons for nuclear proliferation have often
suffered from a recurrent tendency to provide parsimonious security explanations that
tend to oversimplify or to neglect altogether decision-making dynamics.
Despite its obvious deficiencies, the “security model” provides some useful
insights to the understanding of the reasons for nuclear proliferation. This model is
based on neorealist theory which assumes that “each state is like all other states in
being an autonomous political unit….states are made functionally similar by the
constraints of structure (neorealists assume that ‘anarchy’ is a distinct structure that
governs the international system), with the principal difference among them defined
according to capabilities.”46 Moreover, since “states exist in an anarchical
international system, [they] must therefore rely on self-help to protect their
sovereignty and national security.”
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Under such a framework, nuclear weapons are

seen as important factors which would enhance national security since they could be
developed to serve “either as deterrents against overwhelming conventional military
threats or as coercive tools to compel changes in the status quo.”48
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Kenneth Waltz, arguing from a neorealist perspective, emphasizes only the
strategic utility and deterrent aspects of nuclear weapons when he says that “with
nuclear weapons, countries need to threaten to use only a small amount of force. This
is so because once the willingness to use little force is shown, the adversary knows
how easily more can be added. This is not true of conventional weapons.”49 In his
analysis on the reasons for nuclear proliferation, Bradley Thawer argues that the
principal cause of nuclear proliferation is “the desire of states to gain increased
security from external attack in an anarchic world.”50 With reference to Israel, Thayer
contends that its nuclear program was primarily driven by its need to prevent the
occurrence of another Holocaust and its desire to nullify the conventional superiority
of its Arab opponents.51 In the Indian case, he argues that it was primarily motivated
by India’s desire to “match the capabilities of China.”52 Finally, Thayer goes a step
further and maintains that other causes, such as the need to acquire nuclear weapons
for prestige, or due to bureaucratic politics or as a result of “technological pull” are
complementary explanations that are insufficient to explain why states acquired
nuclear weapons.53 Frank Barnaby discusses Israeli “insecurity” suggesting that the
Jews have suffered dreadful persecutions and “given these experiences, the Jews must
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assume that fascist, or other anti-Semitic totalitarian regimes will yet again find that it
suits their ends to persecute them…..Israel feels secure only if it is armed with the
most powerful weapons scientists can produce.”54 Going along with the security
explanation, Robert Harkavy mentions that Israel’s nuclear weapons are intended to
discourage the Arabs from the goal of annihilation of Israel, deter other non-Arab
states from joining the Arab side, using nuclear technology transfer as a bargaining
chip in dealing with other nations and the assurance of ultimate survival for Israel
after “conquered” territory is divested in the event of a final political settlement.55 In
short, the security model rests on the assumptions of neorealist theory which argues
that states are rational actors existing in an anarchical international system and hence
must rely on self-help to protect their sovereignty and national security. It also
assumes that states are unitary actors pursuing policies dictated only by their strategic
threat perceptions.56 In other words, the security model provides a parsimonious
explanation to nuclear proliferation which is “conceptually clear…..and fits our
intuitive belief that important events in history (like the development of a nuclear
weapon) must have equally important causes (like national security).”57
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This thesis attempts to explain nuclear proliferation in Israel and India in terms
of three clusters of possible variables: security, cognitive, and bureaucratic.
Accordingly, the security model will be complemented with two other decisionmaking models: The cognitive approach to decision-making which seeks to examine
the worldviews of decision-makers linking them to important normative concerns
such as prestige and science, and the bureaucratic politics approach with its emphasis
on the role of chief bureaucrats and institutional in-fighting in nuclear politics.
Since nuclear decision-making in those two countries has largely been
confined to a few individuals, the cognitive approach will examine the worldviews or
“attitudinal prism” of key decision-makers. In this regard, the cognitive approach
relaxes the assumption of ‘state rationality’ inherent in the security approach by
illustrating that states do not necessarily “go nuclear” because they are rational,
objective, security-maximizing entities, but because decision-makers within the state
define threats and “act in accordance with their perception of reality, not in response
to reality itself.”58 The concept of attitudinal prism is based on the assumption that
“men chose among alternative paths in accordance with their perception of the world
in which they must act. The lens through which that setting is filtered may…..be
called the Attitudinal Prism.”59 Hence, the research will focus on the worldview of the
decision-makers and their psychological predisposition. In other words, it will be
concerned with “the idiosyncratic qualities of the decision-makers – that is those
58
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aspects of elite attitudes which are not generated by role occupancy.”60 This is based
upon the concept of cognitive consistency, since it assumes an “overall coherent and
interconnected set of beliefs about the nature of political life.”61
Furthermore, Peter Lavoy maintains that “a state is likely to go nuclear when
national elites who want the state to develop nuclear weapons, emphasize the
country’s insecurity or its poor international standing to popularize the ‘myth’ that
nuclear weapons provide military security and political power.”62 Lavoy then rests his
argument on three basic assumptions: (1) The beliefs of individuals matter for foreign
policy making; (2) policymakers’ beliefs about nuclear weapons are particularly
important; and (3) talented and well-placed experts can help create, diffuse, and
perpetuate nuclear myths.63 David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo capture the
dynamics of the Indian case when they maintain that:
“The decisions about India’s nuclear program are usually taken in secret by a few
individuals. India’s vast nuclear establishment continues to function even today without
real public accountability. The chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, for
instance, has the absolute power to ‘initiate, formulate, plan and execute India’s nuclear
program in total secrecy’ and is responsible only to the prime minister. Informed
observers have referred to India’s nuclear decision-making process as ‘scientific and
political czarism’ or as a virtual ‘nuclear sub-government’….There is not much emphasis
on nuclear policy in the media, in public forums, or in the two houses of Parliament – all
of which seem otherwise preoccupied with domestic problems.”64
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In the case of Israel, Avner Cohen points out that three men set the nuclear
project in motion: the nation’s political leader, his chief scientist, and his chief
executive officer. More specifically, he explains that “Ben Gurion believed that Israeli
scientists could provide the ultimate answer to Israel’s security problem. Ernest David
Bergmann, an organic chemist, tutored Ben Gurion in nuclear matters for many years.
Shimon Peres exploited the international opportunity to make the dream into reality.
Without these men the Israeli program would likely not have been launched.”65
Shlomo Aronson and Oded Brosh shed light on some of the domestic debates
that took place in Israel concerning nuclear weapons. They point out that some
influential decision-makers in Israel favored reliance on conventional weapons. They
mention that Yegal Allon, a prominent Israeli politician who is recognized as one of
the best military generals in Israel’s so-called “War of Independence” (1947-1949),
referred a strategy of compellence that “could be achieved by invoking conventional
means in a conventional environment….Nuclear weapons meant, in the case of the
Middle East, a dangerous status-quo, which the Arabs could use for their own
purposes.”66
Besides their more evident security purposes, nuclear weapons have acquired
a certain aura in the international system and have provided those who possess them
with a considerable degree of power and prestige. This has resulted in a situation
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whereby “only the great powers may legitimately possess nuclear weapons…..and
provide mechanisms for the international community to differentiate the status and
legitimacy of the various states.”67 In other words, compliance with the “appropriate”
nuclear norms, as defined by the superpowers, “reinforces the identity of states and
their status as legitimate members of the international community and/or the certain
kind of state (responsible,civilized…etc).”68 For Robert Gilpin, the possession of
nuclear weapons largely determines a nation’s “rank in the hierarchy of international
prestige.”69
In this regard, another element of nuclear decision-making that was
particularly important in the case of India, is the role of normative concerns
manifested in the desire for prestige and the importance that science played in India’s
post-colonial culture. David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo mention that the Indian
nuclear program is not only intended to address national security threats emanating
from China and Pakistan but also to reaffirm India’s national identity and enhance its
prestige as a large country with an ancient civilization that is deserving of a more
dominant role in the world community.70 Moreover, Gaurav Kampani suggests that
India’s decision to test its nuclear weapons in 1998 and to suddenly declare itself a
67
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nuclear weapon state was influenced more by the rise of a prestige-seeking nuclear
coalition led by the belligerent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) than by its long-standing
security concerns. He mentions that the BJP “allied itself with an increasingly vocal
section of India’s strategic community (known as the ‘bomb lobby’) that has come to
identify nuclear weapons as the ultimate index of state power in the international
system.”71
Hence, it becomes necessary that one would shift the focus from materialist
concerns involving balance of power politics and examine the role of normative and
ideational concerns. This requires an understanding of the norms that were valued by
key decision-makers which eventually helped shape the strategic culture of their
respective nations. This approach departs in significant ways from neorealist and
neoliberal approaches to international relations. Materialists in security studies do not
ignore cultural factors altogether, but they treat them as “epiphenomenal” or
secondary, as a “superstructure determined in the last instance by the material base.”72
As Peter Katzenstein explains:
“Neorealist and neoliberal theories adhere to relatively sparse views of the international
system. Neorealism assumes that the international system has virtually no normative
content. The international system constrains national security policies directly without
affecting conceptions of state interest. Neoliberalism takes as given actor identities and
views ideas and beliefs as intervening variables between assumed interests and
behavioral outcomes. In this view states operate in environments that create constraints
and opportunities.”73
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In this regard, norms could be understood as “collective expectations about
proper behavior for a given identity.”74 In the case of India, “prominence norms” have
become increasingly important for many decision-makers. In other words, “norms
held by states widely viewed as successful and desirable” became prominent and
diffused among India’s strategic elite.75 In India’s post-colonial period, there was a
perception that the success of the West was largely due to its scientific and
technological development. In other words, “the idea of science, epitome of and
metaphor for the modern, was a recurrent theme in anti-colonial nationalist
thought.”76 In his presidential address to the Indian Science Congress in 1947,
Jawaharlal Nehru spoke of the relationship between science and development, and of
atomic energy to war, maintaining that “atomic energy – that has suddenly come
about through scientific research – may be used for war and may be used for peace.”77
Even Hindu revivalist groups such as the Arya Samaj, re-read Hindu scriptures, in an
attempt to extract information that could be represented as continuous with modern
scientific knowledge.78 Thus, it is clear that “scientific norms” played an important
role in India during its post-independence period and contributed greatly to nuclear
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decision-making. Moreover, atomic energy was widely perceived as the ultimate
manifestation of India’s technological development and contributing to its national
standing and prestige. It is noted that after China exploded its first nuclear device in
October 1964, some Indians mentioned that “India has to have the bomb if it is to
hold sway in the world…..Not to make it would be to let the whole world treat us like
some third-rate country.”79
In the case of Israel, normative concerns seemed to also play a role especially
in the way in which Ben Gurion linked science to the Zionist state. For Ben Gurion,
scientific achievements were the hallmark of the Zionist state, “a secular
manifestation of the idea of Israel as the ‘chosen people’.”80 However, unlike India,
nuclear weapons and science in Israel were not seen as a manifestation of muchneeded prestige after a long colonial history. Ben Gurion is quoted to have said that
“no other people is superior to us in its intellectual prowess.”81 Robert Harkavy tends
to downplay “non-rational” factors related to national prestige that may have played a
part in Israel’s decision to go nuclear. He mentions that the “traditional and longcelebrated Jewish achievements in science and technology would not suggest a
residue of ‘inferiority’ feelings in the Israelis which would require the nation to prove
its intellectual or technological capability, which has been well demonstrated, in any
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case..….in the indigenous development of a wide range of sophisticated conventional
weapons.”82 Alan Dowty explains further:
“In most if not at all ‘threshold’ countries, the non-military motives of status, prestige,
and equality have exerted considerable influence in favor of a weapons program. (In a
case like India they may have been decisive.) It is unlikely, however, that these
considerations will be of much importance in Israeli nuclear policy. Issues of security are
so predominant in Israeli thinking that the luxury of status-climbing in international
society is hardly relevant.”83

The previous account opens up the “black box” of decision-making by
focusing on the decision-makers and their worldviews and normative concerns.
However, such an approach does not take into consideration that “the acquisition of
nuclear weapons is [also] likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic or political
interests of at least some individual actors within the state.”84 In this light, the
bureaucratic approach would suggest that

bureaucratic actors are not “passive

recipients of top-down political decisions; instead they create the conditions that favor
weapons acquisition by encouraging extreme perceptions of foreign threats,
promoting supportive politicians, and…..[work on the] formation of domestic
coalitions within the scientific-military-industrial complex.”85 This necessitates that
one opens up the “black box” further in order to account for bureaucratic politics and
the role that it played in nuclear politics. In fact, by examining the role and interests of
bureaucratic actors operating within the state, one would have relaxed the second
82
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assumption of the security model which argues that states are unitary actors pursuing
policies that are dictated only by their strategic threat perceptions.
In this regard, the classical works of Graham Allison and Morton Halperin
provide a useful framework for analyzing bureaucratic politics.86 Allison maintains
that the Bureaucratic Politics Model “sees no unitary actor but many actors as players
– players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national
problems as well; players who act in no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather
according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals;
players who make government decisions not by a single rational choice but by the
pulling and hauling that is politics.”87 Moreover, a bureaucracy is more likely to
support a government policy that will promote the bureaucracy’s organizational
essence and oppose those policies that would weaken or take away those
organizational functions. Morton Halperin contends that “stands on issues are affected
by the desire to maintain influence. This could lead to support for certain policies
which will require greater reliance on the organization. Participants prefer courses of
action which will require information from them or which they will be asked to
implement. They recognize that they will gain influence if such decisions are made.”88
However, one must understand that bureaucracies are not single monolithic
structures but often there are disagreements and struggles within a single bureaucracy.
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In other words, “in some organizations the same view of the organization’s essence is
shared by all those in the same promotion and career structure. In other cases there
will be difference of view. The differences may concern the particulars of a broad
agreed essence or may reflect struggles for dominance.”89
Within the context of nuclear proliferation, bureaucratic theory argues that the
decision to proliferate is made by key individuals within the scientific or defense
bureaucracies of states. Those individuals advocate proliferation in order to enhance
or increase the power of their bureaucracies and therefore push the state towards
nuclear proliferation. In the case of India, the pivotal role played by Homi Bhabha –
the Chief of the Atomic Energy Commission – and his central role in the genesis and
growth of India’s civil and military nuclear program, from the initial acquisition of
research reactors, to the initial deployment of a Canadian-built reactor, the
development of plutonium reprocessing facilities in Trombay, and finally his 1965
attempt to pressure Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri into developing nuclear
weapons, bears witness to the important role of key bureaucrats.90 In the case of
Israel, the role played by Ernest David Bergmann – the Chief of Israel’s Atomic
Energy Commission, scientific director of the Weizmann Institute and, since 1949, the
chairman of the scientific department of the Haganah (and later the Ministry of
Defense) is also a case in point. In Israel, many internal conflicts that are of a
bureaucratic and partisan nature took place. For instance, the conflict that took place
in the spring and summer of 1951 between David Bergmann and Chaim Weizmann
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(Israel’s first president and the founder of the Weizmann Institute of Science) over the
control and funding of the Weizmann Institute, is a case in point.91 Thus, it becomes
clear that bureaucratic politics had a significant impact on nuclear decision-making in
both India and Israel.
Frank Barnaby contends that the Israeli decision to build nuclear weapons was
largely derived from its need to deter the Arabs from threatening Israel’s existence,
yet he mentions that such an explanation is not adequate to explain the size and
quality of Israel’s nuclear arsenal.92 Moreover, he mentions that the Israeli goal of
deterrence could be achieved by a much smaller nuclear arsenal, and hence the
creation of a large and sophisticated nuclear arsenal could not be solely attributed to
the “deterrence” explanation. He suggests that the most likely explanation for Israel’s
large and sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal is the “technological momentum of
the nuclear-weapon program [which] has taken over and become unstoppable.”93
Barnaby sheds light on some of the domestic dynamics taking place inside Israel by
referring to Israel’s scientists and technologists and their need “to design and produce
increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons just to convince themselves that they can
do so for the sheer satisfaction of it.”94 This further illustrates the importance of the
“scientific bureaucracy” in Israel and its impact on nuclear developments in that
country.
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______________________________

In summary, the above introduction was an attempt to rationalize nuclear
politics within the context of the declared research objectives and the conceptual and
methodological frameworks employed. The importance of multilevel explanations, as
opposed to monocausal ones, are key towards understanding the reasons for nuclear
proliferation. Moreover, the presence of empirically significant but undertheorized
literature on Israel and India necessitates that one attempts to establish the causal link
between both neorealist and decision-making theories, on the one hand, and the
subtleties of nuclear proliferation on the other. Such are the main goals of the current
work and will be addressed thoroughly in the coming chapters.
The coming two chapters will provide a more in-depth outlook on nuclear
decision-making in Israel and India – an outlook which is much more specific and
detailed. Each country will be examined in a separate chapter. The chapters will
address the reasons for each country’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons and the
dynamics of its nuclear decision-making during the formative period of its nuclear
program in which the most important nuclear decisions were undertaken. In the Israeli
case, this means focusing on the period between 1948 and 1970 and in the Indian one,
it entails examining the period between 1947 and 1974. In order to capture the
complexity of nuclear politics, the research will attempt to apply a multilevel analysis.
First, the thesis will attempt to apply the security argument on nuclear proliferation as
it relates to each country’s threat perceptions within the context of the regional and
international systems. Second, for each case study, the thesis will use insights from
decision-making theory to explain those features that have not been adequately
explained by the security perspective.
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Moreover, the final conclusive chapter will be a comparative evaluation for
the rationale behind the Indian and Israeli nuclear programs, which should be both
empirically and theoretically significant. In addition, it should shed some light on
more general Third World nuclear issues and try to examine the Indian and Israeli
cases of nuclear proliferation within the context of other third world cases of nuclear
proliferation or non-proliferation.
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CHAPTER 2
ISRAEL – A RELENTLESS QUEST FOR SECURITY ?

This chapter will attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of Israel’s decision to
acquire, develop, and deploy nuclear weapons. First, this chapter will discuss Israeli
threat perceptions within the framework of the security model. Second, it will attempt
to isolate those factors that have not been accounted for by the security model. The
decision-making section will mainly focus on the period between 1948 and 1970 – the
formative period of Israel’s nuclear decision-making. It is during that period that most
of Israel’s major nuclear decisions were undertaken and its nuclear doctrine fully
materialized. However, in order to examine change in Israel’s nuclear policy and
patterns of decision-making, references will be made to important decisions and
events in the post-1970 period that had a significant impact on that country’s nuclear
posture. In this regard, the worldviews or attitudinal prisms of key decision-makers
and their influence on nuclear decision-making is immensely important. Of particular
importance, are the worldviews of the nuclear advocates and the pioneers of Israel’s
nuclear program such as Ben-Gurion, Shimon Perez, Ernest David Bergmann and
Moshe Dayan. Furthermore, the research will examine the role that science played, as
an important normative construct and an integral part of the worldview of key nuclear
decision-makers in Israel. Also, bureaucratic politics played an important role in
Israeli nuclear decision-making. This was manifested in struggles for power and
pulling and hauling between the heads and prominent members of important
bureaucracies such as the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), the Ministry of

36

Defence, scientists and executive officials in Israel. This struggle also reflected
personal and partisan interests.

The Security Perspective
Much of the discussion on Israel’s nuclear program has focused mainly on
security threats facing Israel and how those threats lead to that country’s decision to
acquire nuclear weapons. Alan Dowty summarizes the dominant scholarly approach
to understanding Israel’s nuclear decision: “Let us suppose for a moment that we
knew nothing about the actual state of Israeli nuclear weapons program. Looking
simply at Israel’s situation and the options available, what kind of program would we
predict as the most likely course of action ? In other words, what seems to be the
logical perspective on nuclear weapons for a state with Israel’s security problems,
capabilities and international standing.”95 Hence, the security perspective derives
itself from an intellectual process that involves looking at the security threats facing
Israel and directly linking them to Israel’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons. This
section will describe the structural characteristics of the Middle East regional system
and move on to discuss the possible security threats that supposedly have lead Israel
to acquire nuclear weapons.
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The Middle East Regional System
In order for one to understand the security threats facing Israel, one first has to
define the system within which Israel operates and to which the development of
nuclear weapons was a response. The Middle East will be dealt with in this section as
a “regional system” or what Michael Brecher defines as a “subordinate state
system”.96 First, the Middle East is multipolar in terms of the number of actors.97 The
central actors in terms of foreign and strategic policy issues are: Egypt, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Those actors give the region its multipolar character.
Second, power is distributed asymmetrically among the central actors.
interstate conflict and competition is persistent.
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Third,

Fourth, states in the region are

engaged in a series of arms races which are fueled and complicated by the large
number of regional conflicts and the financial reserves of the oil states.

100

Fifth, the

Middle East is characterized by the prominence of military regimes, widespread
political instability and the lack of established procedures for the change of
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government.101 Sixth, the Middle East is characterized by a high level of superpower
involvement due to the fact that the superpowers have always had clear economic and
strategic interests in the region and obligations to regional allies.102 Seventh, the
Middle East suffers from a high level of interstate violence. Since World War II, there
have been several major military confrontations most important of which are: six
Arab-Israeli wars; the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 1991 Gulf
War.103 Moreover, the region has been characterized by ‘nonwar violence’ and lowintensity conflict between Israel and Arab states and among Arab states themselves.
Eighth, the region has been exposed to several moderating influences on interstate
violence such as the Arab-Israeli peace process, balances of deterrence between
regional states, superpower influence, and the recognition of the high costs involved
in military confrontations by some political elites.104 Nevertheless, one must put those
“moderating influences” in their proper perspective. The modification of the
international system following the demise of the Soviet Union (the Arab patron), the
ascendancy of the United States, and the changes in the Middle East in the wake of
the 1991 Gulf War have been generally considered beneficial to Israel’s security and a
prelude to the so-called “peace process”. However, it is still uncertain whether those
changes will inevitably lead to a comprehensive regional détente. As Efraim Enbar
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maintains: “the myopic preoccupation with the details of the negotiations between
Arabs and Israelis blurs the Middle Eastern picture. It is all too easily forgotten that
the Middle East, in contrast to other regions where the New World Order has
drastically improved the security situation, remains a “zone of turmoil”, characterized
by continuos security challenges…..and it remains a region where the use of force is
widely considered a policy option and even enjoys popular support”.105

The Strategic Utility of Israel’s Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear analysts have attributed multiple security reasons for Israel’s
possession of nuclear weapons. However, one must note that this type of analysis is
very speculative and arbitrary. In this regard, Robert Harkavy mentioned that: “At
best, one can speculate, moving back and forth in a shadowy area of definable
doctrines, various circumstances and possible uses: the possibilities can only be
surmised, the analysis only indicative”.106 This section will mainly focus on
frequently attributed reasons for Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons within the
previously mentioned security model.
Perhaps the most dominant explanation for Israel’s possession of nuclear
weapons is the potential for its use as a “last resort” counter-cities threat against
nuclear and massive conventional attacks, with the implied threat of total retaliation
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for vengeance’ sake should deterrence fail.107 Alan Dowty maintains that the
“minimal aim of any Israeli nuclear weapons program would be to offset an Arab
nuclear force should such a force be developed”.108 That has generally been regarded
as an unlikely occurrence due to the fact that, in general, Arab attempts to acquire
nuclear weapons have made little progress.109 However, the Iraqi attempt to acquire
nuclear weapons seemed to have provided a clear threat to Israel’s interests, which
lead to the bombing of the Osiraq reactor in Iraq in 1981. Israeli strategists seem to
put great emphasis on the danger of Arab/Muslim nuclear weapons programs and the
necessity of using all means to halt them, maybe even including nuclear weapons.
This theme was repeated in a public statement by the Israeli government after the
1981 bombing of the Osiraq reactor: “under no circumstances would we allow the
enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our nation; we will defend
Israel’s citizens, in time, with all the means at our disposal.”110 Also, in April 1992, in
the aftermath of the Gulf War, IDF-Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Amnon
Shahak, said: “I think Israel should invest all its energy and efforts in preventing the
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development of a nuclear capability in an Arab state. In my opinion, all means are
legitimate to obtain this objective.”111
It seems, however, that the threat of a large-scale conventional attack on Israel
is a more realistic possibility. Harkavy, writing during the Cold War, envisioned a
scenario where Israel is confronted by war on several fronts at the same time and
faces the specter of imminent annihilation. In other words, a combined attack by
several Arab/Muslim states on Israel, and a simultaneous Arab uprising in the
occupied territories leads to the breakdown of Israeli defenses after the IDF has been
outnumbered and its organizational efficiency undermined “like many other cases in
history, most recently in Vietnam, when the Israeli army begins to lose heart and
crack, it goes into pieces with surprising suddenness”.112
In this regard, the Israeli military establishment and its supporters are mainly
influenced by the relative conventional military strength of Israel’s adversaries, which
affects their thinking about the need for nuclear weapons. In fact, conventional
weapons that have been purchased by the Arab states are much more sophisticated
today than they were in previous years and given its “critical vulnerability in terms of
geography and demography, Israel maintains that it cannot afford an Arab
conventional superiority, even a temporary one, on the battlefield, as there would be
far-reaching consequences, such as heavy losses in human life and a reduction in the
size of the state. This is so even with the peace agreements concluded between Israel
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and Egypt and, more recently, between Israel and the PLO and Jordan”113. In other
words, the threat of an even temporary Arab superiority on the battlefield is
considered “axiomatic to the destruction of the state and the people”.114
The Israelis suggest that when Israel started to think of developing its nuclear
option, there was little evidence of Arab willingness to tolerate any coexistence with
the Jewish state. Amidst periodic references to “pushing Israel into the sea”, Israelis
seemed to conclude that its Arab neighbors intended to duplicate the ouster of the
Crusaders seven centuries ago.115 Frank Barnaby, although writing in 1989 – before
the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent dismantling of the Iraqi military machine –
nevertheless gives a relevant illustrative account of the military balance between the
Arab armies and Israel.116 He maintains that for purposes of comparison, Syria, Iraq
and Jordan alone (without Egypt) possess wartime armies totaling some 1.8 million
soldiers, 10,000 main battle tanks, and 1,342 fighter aircraft. Facing them is Israel’s
wartime strength of about 444,000 soldiers, 4,000 tanks, and 662 fighter aircraft.117
Barnaby contends that these Arab armies are roughly the same size as NATO’s total
active ground forces plus its ground force reserves deployed in Central Europe (i.e,
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37 (Autumn 1983):

the NATO forces deployed in West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg), its tanks are about the same as the total number of NATO’s main battle
tanks, and the number of Arab aircraft is four times as many as NATO has in central
Europe.118
Israel’s quantitative military inferiority has so far been offset by its
technological, operational and tactical superiority. However, from the Israeli
perspective, there seems to be widespread pessimism with regards to both the
maintenance of Israel’s qualitative edge over the Arabs over a long period of time,
and also with regards to the durability of peace arrangements in the Middle East.
Concerning the former issue, Taysir Nashif suggests that “most of Israel’s
military and political leaders believed that with the passage of time, the quantitative
superiority that the Arabs have in economic and human resources would become
greater, and that the Arabs would narrow the technological, scientific and educational
gap existing between them and the Israelis.”119 Those apprehensions were illustrated
in the swift social, political, economic and military modernization of the Arab
countries which occurred in the post-independence years. For example, the 1952
Egyptian revolution and Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir’s coming to power in Egypt in 1954,
and the fiasco of the tripartite military attack shared by France, Great Britain and
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Israel on Egypt in 1956, lead to diminishing Western influence in the Arab lands and
the strengthening of the Egyptian regime which was vehemently anti-Israeli.120
The decisive steps in Israel’s nuclear history were taken in mid- and late1960’s, with the 1967 June War serving as the catalyst.121 Despite Israel’s massive
victory over the Arab armies during that war, Israelis still remember “the sense of
abandonment and solitude that characterized their situation during the three weeks
immediately preceding the outbreak of the war”.122 Benjamin Frankel maintains that
“between 15 May and 6 June 1967 Egypt marched its army into Sinai and blockaded
the Straits of Tiran; Syria concentrated its forces on the Golan Heights, overlooking
Israel’s northern sector; and Jordan allowed Iraqi and Egyptian forces to enter its
territory and move close to the Israeli border. The Arab leaders accompanied the
encirclement of Israel with dire and explicit predictions concerning Israel’s fate.
There were expressions of concern for Israel in Western capitals but little concrete
action was offered to assist it”.123 Moreover, the War of Attrition in 1968-70, the
surprise of the 1973 October War and the improved performance of the Arab armies
in it, and the growing economic and political influence of the Arab states in the wake
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of the oil embargo, indicated that the political, economic, and military trends favored
the Arab states.124
Furthermore, the vulnerability of Israel was made very clear in the October
1973 War since “the war challenged a basic assumption concerning Israeli
conventional superiority concerning the extent of self-reliance on Israeli conventional
military strength, and about Arab military performance”.125 Some interpret the
increased number of Israelis killed in military action as a proof of the narrowing of
this gap. For example, in the 1956 Sinai war, fewer than 300 Israelis were killed; in
the June 1967 war some 600 Israelis were killed, whereas in the 1973 war over 3,500
were killed.126 The late Nahum Goldman, who served as President of the World
Zionist Organization, held the view that this existing technological gap would narrow
in favor of the Arabs explaining that “the Arabs with a past brilliant civilization will
certainly acquire Western technological know-how in the military field as well as
peaceful endeavors.”127
Regarding the weakness of security arrangements in the Middle East and
hence Israel’s pervasive feelings of “insecurity”, the views of Shalheveth Freier, a
senior scientist and former Director of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission are quite
illuminating. He maintains that regional arrangements in the region are unreliable: “In
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the past 26 years, Egypt and Syria joined together in the United Arab Republic, which
soon fell apart; a union of Syria and Iraq came to nothing and the two countries are
now enemies; a similar plan for Syria and Libya miscarried; and many agreements
between the PLO and the Lebanese government have broken down. The Saudi
Arabian regime and the Sheikhdoms in the Gulf are unstable. For these reasons, Israel
is reluctant to rely on formal agreements, at their face value with their hostile
neighbors….Israel has a very small margin of error….Israelis feel permanently under
siege….As regards wealth, the gross domestic product of Israel ($22,160 million in
1986) is a mere quarter of that of Saudi Arabia alone ($82,440 million in 1986).”128
Moreover, Israel is also perceived as being able to make tactical use of nuclear
weapons, in addition to its counter-city massive retaliation utility. Harkavy suggests
that in any future Middle East conflict, Israel might unleash a tactical nuclear attack
against Arab troop concentrations which were threatening the annihilation of the
Israeli army.129
Furthermore, Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons could also be perceived
as a psychological weapon intended to discourage the Arabs from the goal of
annihilation of Israel. Robert Harkavy writes: “Logically, to the extent that Israeli
nuclear weapons make it very unlikely that the Arabs could destroy Israel without
themselves suffering enormous, probably, unacceptable, damage, nuclear weapons are
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a road to ‘final peace’ in the Middle East.”130 Hence, for Israel, nuclear weapons are
seen as a means by which they could impose upon the Arabs a political settlement to
the Arab-Israeli struggle under the shadow of their nuclear monopoly by signaling to
the Arabs that Israel is there to stay. Israeli nuclear weapons are intended to bring
about an Arab realization “that neither the present balance of forces nor any
foreseeable future power alignment will offer a viable military option to destroy
Israel…..Nuclear weapons [will] induce moderation and a revolution of declining
expectations in the ‘Arab street’, as the end-of-the-world character of atomic war is
understood by both mass and elite elements within the Arab World.”131 Fuad Jabber,
the Arab-American scholar, noted that “the psychological erosive effects of the
nuclear logic would be at work on the Arab will, gradually producing that pervasive
feeling of doubt and eventually resignation and despair about the dream of
annihilating Israel from the world’s map.”132
In fact, Israeli nuclear weapons seemed to have played an important role, not
only in deterring Arabs from the final goal of annihilating Israel, but also in limiting
Arab ambitions during negotiations and in wartime.

William B. Quandt, in an

interview with Schlomo Aronson, mentions that during the 1973 October War, Sadat
indeed recognized the dangers inherent in an overall offensive, even in a limited one,
beyond the Sinai passes because of the anticipated Israeli nuclear response: “The
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Israeli nuclear response has dictated his calculations ever since, and was the source of
his controversy with Qaddafi.”133 Also, it seems that Israel’s nuclear weapons played
an important role in Sadat’s thinking during the Camp David negotiations. Shlomo
Aronson and Oded Broch maintain that “neither President Carter nor President Sadat
could pressure Israel to make concessions in regard to the nuclear option. How could
they, when, in fact, this nuclear option was one of the main reasons Sadat was ready
to negotiate in the first place – not in the sense that he feared a nuclear attack from
Israel, but rather in the sense that he was involved now with the United States, Israel’s
patron, which demanded peace from the Arabs…..he could not afford to ignore this
demand…..ignoring this demand was dangerous by itself, but it was even more
dangerous because of the record of the leading Israeli ‘troika’…..they were likely to
be less responsive to American pressure, and…..more conscious of Israel’s own
nuclear potential due to the 1973 debacle, especially after Israeli-made Jericho
missiles were added to Israel’s arsenal. Israel’s airforce was now more capable of
hitting Egyptian targets than before.”134
Moreover, Avner Cohen suggests that Israel’s image as an “invincible nuclear
power” may have persuaded Egypt to make peace with Israel and later also helped
Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation to take place. He maintains that: “As it has been for
years, the nuclear factor in the Middle East is opaque, indirect, and tacit. …..Israeli
nuclear weapons were important in encouraging Arab realism….It was instrumental
in bringing Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977 and it may have
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been even more important in convincing other Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, to
recognize that the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be resolved by the sword….David
Ben Gurion’s nuclear vision has been vindicated.”135
More interestingly, Israel Shahak, relying on articles published by important
Israeli generals and intelligence experts commenting on the pages of the Hebrew
press, maintains that the real aims of Israeli policies is to establish a hegemony over
the entire Middle East by “stabilizing the regimes which do not disturb too much the
Israeli progress towards that aim and a possible use of nuclear weapons for this
purpose.”136 He maintains that “within the context of possible uses of Israeli nuclear
power…..Israel has contingency plans to be applied if the ‘Egyptian regime should
change’ or because ‘the Saudi royal family will not reign forever’…..Israel is
preparing for war, nuclear if needed be, for the sake of averting domestic change not
to its liking, if it occurs in some or any Middle Eastern states.”137 In this regard, he
further adds that “at some time after the fall of the Shah it was disclosed that in the
last days of his regime the Israeli Army planned to dispatch elite units to
Tehran…..except that Begin, in a display of relative moderation, refused to okay the
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venture.”138 Hence, Israel’s nuclear weapons capability is seen as a deterrent against
radical domestic change in the Arab/Muslim world and also as an asset to regional
regimes fearful of an Islamic fundamentalist takeover. Domestic changes within
Middle Eastern states seem to fall within Israel’s so-called “red lines”. Those red lines
have a “powerful deterrent effect by virtue of causing uncertainty beyond its borders,
precisely because they are not clearly marked or explicitly defined. The purpose of
these red lines is to determine what regional developments or other changes occurring
beyond Israel’s borders can be defined as threats which Israel itself will regard as
intolerable to the point of being compelled to use all its military power for the sake of
their prevention or eradication.”139
Another reason that was often attributed to Israel’s decision to produce nuclear
weapons, is to deter Soviet involvement in the Middle East conflict and any possible
Soviet threat that might have endangered the existence of Israel during the Cold War.
In other words, the development of nuclear weapons in Israel also sought to face the
Soviet challenge to its political and territorial interests and to limit Soviet activities in
the Middle East, by “raising the stakes of the game and making Moscow reassess the
possible gains and risks. Some of the Soviet activities had a bearing on Israel. Such
activities were in the form of Soviet arms supplies to Arab countries, training of Arab
armed forces, offering of technical assistance to Arab countries which were in conflict
with Israel, and support for the Arab position on the question of Palestine and the
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return of lands which Israel has occupied since June 1967”.140 This is based upon the
concept of “proportionate deterrence” given the unequal interests of the two sides:
faced with destruction, Israel might credibly threaten the Soviet Union, while from a
Soviet perspective the possible loss of one or two cities to a desperate Israeli blow
might indeed cause hesitation.141
Despite the plausibility of this strategic assessment, many experts tend to
belittle the Soviet threat to Israel’s existence during the Cold War and hence refute the
notion that the Israeli nuclear program was intended to deter the Soviet Union. Alan
Dowty maintains that “it seems unlikely, on balance, however, that Israeli policy
makers seriously considered the deterrence of the Soviet Union a plausible aim
(Indeed, one encounters the idea more often from non-Israelis more than from
Israelis)….In any event, it would be a secondary calculation since the more immediate
danger is not direct Soviet intervention, but Soviet-supplied Arab armies.”142 Shai
Feldman also suggests that an Israeli nuclear attack on the Soviet Union is not
plausible given that “the Soviets have the densest air defense system in the world,
with 5,000 surveillance radars, over 2,500 interceptors and about 12,000 surfaceto-air missiles launchers.”143 He maintains that “for Israel to adopt a counter-Soviet
nuclear posture has no merits, but it does have three important disadvantages: it would
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be infeasible, unnecessary, and highly detrimental to Israeli security”.144 He contends
that the American commitment to Israel, regardless of its extent and vagueness, is
enough to deter the Soviet Union.145 In addition, another possible Soviet response to
the Israeli bomb, might have been to become deeply involved in the region rather than
to withdraw, since there will be pressure from its Arab clients for it to pursue a more
active role.146

Israel’s Nuclear Decision-Making
The previous section was an attempt to capture the essence of Israel’s nuclear
program and its raison d’etre. However, the analysis was based on the security
perspective which dealt with the issue on a purely strategic-rational basis that mainly
depended upon analysis undertaken by previous authors as to the presumed aims of
Israel’s nuclear program. As previously mentioned, such an approach to the study of
the Israeli nuclear program is deficient in that deals with Israel as a single, unitary,
rational actor pursuing policies that are dictated only by its strategic position,
capabilities, and security challenges. As Uri-Bar Joseph says: “The most widely held
conception of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as far as the nuclear strategy is concerned,
considers the Arab countries and Israel to be unitary actors. This is not only fallacious
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– it is dangerous ; many contradictions exist among the nuclear policies of Arab states
as well as between Israeli policymakers.”147
Hence, this section seeks to provide a more in-depth approach to the reasons
for Israel’s nuclear program by focusing on that country’s decision-making
mechanism. In short, it will focus on the idiosyncrasies of the “nuclear myth-makers”
– nuclear advocates such as Ben-Gurion, Shimon Perez, Ernest David Bergmann, and
Moshe Dayan. The objective is to illustrate how their cognitive characteristics played
a prominent role in Israel’s initial decision to go nuclear (which took place during the
1956-1958 period) and how it shaped its general strategy. Furthermore, it will also
attempt to show how normative constructs such as “science” were important in
Israel’s nuclear decision-making as they were closely associated with the worldview
of the nuclear advocates and founders of Israel’s nuclear weapons program.
Moreover, it will illustrate the role played by bureaucratic in-fighting and struggles
for power within and among the different sectors of the Israeli nuclear bureaucracy.
From the beginning, Israel surrounded its nuclear policy, with a high degree of
ambiguity. Publicly, Israel adhered to a policy of avoiding any reference to the precise
state of its nuclear capability. Even its declarations were limited to repeated
‘ambiguous’ statements to the effect that Israel “would not be the first to introduce
nuclear weapons to the Middle East”.148 More elaboration could be found on Israel’s
nuclear policy in the words of Yuval Ne’eman who has served as a senior military
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intelligence officer, Israel science attache in Paris, the Chairman of Israel’s Atomic
Energy Commission, and Minister of Science: “During the 1950’s and 1960’s, I was a
partner to the creation of a security concept, the essence of which was that Israel
would build a nuclear infrastructure – largely in research – which could be
materialized in time of need…..Israel is ambiguous about its nuclear capability. It
follows two principles: first, it would not be the first to “nuclearize” the Middle East;
second, should it be required, it would not take Israel very long to materialize its
nuclear potential.”149
On a strategic level, this policy of nuclear ambiguity seemed to have been
designed to produce effective “deterrence through uncertainty” since the Arab states
inability to rule out the possibility that Israel might posses a nuclear capability and
might use it in retaliation was expected to deter them from posing a threat to its
survival and existence.150 Furthermore, it provided Israel with the ability to avoid a
clash with the United States and with international nonproliferation norms, and to
reduce the domestic pressure on Arab regimes demanding that their governments
should follow suit and build a countervailing nuclear capability. In this regard, as long
as Arab governments could confess uncertainty with regards to Israel’s nuclear
potential, they could effectively resist domestic pressures demanding a response to
Israel’s nuclear weapons.151
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Israel’s ambiguous nuclear position did not only come as a result of the
strategic challenges that Israel faces, but also as a result of domestic imperatives. In
other words, it could be regarded as a compromise between the two schools of
thought in Israel on nuclear weapons. As Shai Feldman suggests: “Among Israel’s
policy elite, the ambiguous posture was originally a compromise between advocates
of greater reliance on nuclear deterrence, and those who claimed that such deterrence
was irrelevant to the Middle East or counterproductive for Israel.”152 Etel Solingen
goes as far as to maintain that “coalition and party politics…played a very important
role in propelling ‘opaqueness’”.153 This illustrates the importance of domestic
imperatives such as the attitudinal prisms of decision-makers, party politics and
bureaucratic factors in nuclear decision-making and its role in shaping Israeli nuclear
policy.

“Nuclear Mythmaking” – The Cognitive Approach to Decision-Making
In Israel there are two schools of though with regards to nuclear weapons: One
is the pro-nuclear school and this includes David Ben-Gurion, Shimon Perez, Moshe
Dayan and Ernest David Bergmann.154 The other has been the conventional school of
thought and it includes Yigal Allon, Ariel Sharon, and Yitzhak Rabin.155 The major
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difference in both positions to nuclear weapons, is the “question of whether Israel, in
the current as well as the predicted quantitative proportions of the conflict, will be
able to preserve its security solely through the conventional forces of the IDF. Those
who believe that the army is, and will always be, a deterrent reject the ‘introduction’
of nuclear arms to the conflict.”156
It is also important to note that the difference between both schools on the
nuclear question is not as huge as it seems at first. The term ‘introduction’ is rather
ambiguous and not well-defined in Israeli strategy. It is unclear whether ‘introduction’
means embarking upon a nuclear weapons program in terms of research and the
production of its initial materials or the actual installation of nuclear arms on missile
warheads. In other words, the real difference between both schools is the question of
“how far Israel should go in its nuclear weapons program” as opposed to whether
Israel should or should not keep the nuclear option open. Avner Cohen explains:
“Most political and military leaders did not share Ben-Gurion’s pessimism in the late
1950’s and early 1960’s, or Dayan’s gloomy conclusions that in the long-run Israel
would not be able to keep up with the conventional arms race. They did not dispute,
however, the notion that Israel must prepare itself for the worst-case scenario – a swift
and dramatic deterioration of Israel’s ‘basic security’. The idea of a nuclear weapons
program as a safety net has enjoyed almost total national consensus in Israel.”157

It is also important to note that the division of political forces among the
Israeli parties does not correspond, or run parallel to, the division of perceptions on
the nuclear question. In other words, there is no necessary correspondence between
the division “hawks/doves” on the territorial issue and “hawks/doves” on the nuclear
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issue. In fact, some “doves” advocate Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons since to
them, the nuclear alternative is a way to guarantee Israel’s security in the event that an
agreement is reached with the Arabs and the occupied territories are compromised.158
The thesis will focus on the staunch nuclear advocates, or the so-called
technological-nuclear group, since their perceptions and general input shaped the
Israeli nuclear path to a very great degree. As Peter Lavoy suggested: “a government
is likely to go nuclear when proficient and well-placed individuals who want their
country to build nuclear bombs, exaggerate security threats to make a ‘myth of
nuclear security’ more compelling.” This portrayal of Israeli nuclear politics relaxes
the security model’s assumption concerning state rationality as the prime motivator
behind strategic threat perception and state action, and focuses more on the role
played by the subjective worldview of the nuclear myth-maker in the acquisition of
nuclear weapons.
The Israeli nuclear program was set in-motion by four men – its main ‘nuclear
myth-makers’: the nation’s founder, David Ben-Gurion, its chief scientist, Ernest
David Bergmann, Moshe Dayan, his chief of staff, and Shimon Perez, Ben-Gurion’s
confidant and the one who was entrusted by Ben-Gurion to lead Israel’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons. Hence, the cognitive characteristics and attitudinal prisms of those
four nuclear advocates and decision-makers are important for one to be able to
understand the reasons for Israel’s nuclear weapons program.
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David Ben-Gurion – The Founder and Protector:
The impact that David Ben-Gurion had on Israel’s nuclear weapons program
was immense since he was, not only the founder of the state, but also the chief
architect of its security policy during the state’s formative period. He was Israel’s
longest serving prime minister (1948-53, 1955-63) and he was also defense minister
between 1955-63. Hence from the period between 1955 till 1963 he assumed the role
of both prime minister and defense minister. Moreover, his role tends to be great in
national security decision-making due to his preeminence among Israel’s high policy
elite and his tendency to identify Israel’s policies with himself. Israel’s foreign
minister Abba Ebban said: “Ben Gurion has a monistic view of history; his
perspective does not encompass a plurality of factors influencing the course of events.
More than De Gaulle or Churchill he identifies the nation’s history with himself;
whatever does not involve him he simply ignores.”159 Or as Avner Cohen commented:
“Ben-Gurion’s worldview and his decisive governing style shaped his critical role in
initiating Israel’s nuclear program.”160
Ben-Gurion’s worldview was characterized by an extreme emphasis on, and
sensitivity to, national security issues that are related to the actual physical survival of
Israel. This might seem natural since all states fear threats to their national security
interests. Yet, Ben Gurion had a comprehensive and

multidimensional view of

security and defined ‘national security’ in very inclusive terms. More specifically, he
suggested: “Just as the problem of Israel’s security is different from that of any other
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country, so the scope of our defense is wider than that of any country…...Security
means economic independence…..Security means the fostering of research and
scientific skill on the highest level in all branches of [science and] technology……But
Israel can have no security without her Defense Forces, and we must meet their needs
in equipment of the finest quality.”161
Within Ben-Gurion’s overall security logic, nuclear weapons was considered
as an important factor towards the establishment of a permanent Jewish presence in
Palestine. In fact, the necessity of establishing an everlasting presence in Palestine
was a major component in Ben-Gurion’s “attitudinal prism”. Ben-Gurion maintained
that: “Arab peace with us is possible only if we are able to prove to them….that the
Jewish factor [in this country] is not hopeless or temporary, but is rather potent and
permanent, and is a historical fact that cannot be cancelled or weakened or
ignored.”162
Another major component of Ben-Gurion’s worldview was his tremendous
belief in science and technology. Avner Cohen suggests: “Ben-Gurion believed that
science and technology had two roles in the realization of Zionism: to advance the
State of Israel spiritually and materially, and to provide for better defense against its
external enemies.”163 Ben-Gurion remarked: “We are inferior to other peoples in our
numbers, dispersion, and the characteristics of our political life, but no other people is
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superior to us in its intellectual prowess. Until now we have disseminated our
intellectual capital in foreign lands, and helped many nations in the great scientific
achievements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries…..There is no reason why the
genius of science would not blossom and flourish in his native land.”164As Perez
suggested: “Ben-Gurion believed that Science could compensate us for what Nature
has denied us.”165
More specifically, since the late 1940’s, Ben Gurion seemed to have had a
special fascination with nuclear energy. In an April 1948 letter to one of his
operatives in Europe, Ben-Gurion issued instructions to seek out Eastern European
Jewish scientists who could “either increase the capacity to kill masses or to cure
masses; both things are important.”166 In a pamphlet, Ben Gurion wrote in November
1948 for distribution among new recruits to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), he
wrote: “We are living in an age of scientific revolutions, an era that discloses the
atom, its miraculous composition, and the tremendous power hidden in it.”167 Avner
Cohen maintains that this theme in Ben-Gurion’s strategic thinking is repeated in
speeches, diary notes, and conversations in which Ben-Gurion referred to the atomic
revolution as an “unprecedented transformation of the history of civilization.”168
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Furthermore, in June 1963, Ben-Gurion paid a visit to Israel’s authority for the
Development of Armaments. In a closed circle of trustworthy members he secretly
outlined his vision of Israel’s future: “We need all possible means of defense; and I
don’t want to say what the most effective means is and what it signifies.”169 Moreover,
Ben-Gurion’s enthusiasm with regards to the development of a nuclear potential
seemed to have been part of the concept of “cumulative deterrence” which he
developed more than ten years before Israel’s independence was established. In 1936
he stressed: “Only with the increase of our strength will the Arabs understand that this
destructive and futile war against the forces building this country must be brought to
an end. Only if we become a large force which cannot be shaken or silenced
[emphasis added] will the Arab leaders understand the inevitability of reconciliation
with the presence of the Jewish people in this country.”170
Another major component of Ben-Gurion’s attitudinal prism was his
pessimism with regards to Israel’s future. He expressed this pessimism many times to
his inner circle of aides as well as during talks with foreign leaders. Yitzchak Navon,
the prime minister’s secretary in the later 1950’s, recalled some of Ben-Gurion’s
statements at the time: “I could not sleep all night, not even for one second. I had one
fear in my heart: a combined attack of all Arab armies.”171 Another typical expression
of his was: “What is Israel ?…..A small spot….How can she survive in this Arab
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World ?”172 Even as Israel’s so-called ‘War of Independece’ concluded in 1949 with
an Israeli victory, Ben-Gurion was convinced that the cessation of hostilities would
not lead to lasting peace but only a “temporary pause” since he saw ‘Arab hostility’
towards Israel as “deep and long-lasting”.173
Hence, it becomes clear that due to his general worldview and governing
style, Ben-Gurion sought to make Israel, nuclear capable. Avner Cohen maintains that
it is unclear when exactly Ben-Gurion began to think about nuclear weapons as a
“practical option” despite his fascination with the idea since the early days of the
State. However, Cohen suggests that it was only after Ben-Gurion assumed the dual
position of Minister of Defense and Prime Minister in 1955 and after Eisenhower’s
Atoms for Peace program, that he “became convinced that the time had come to
pursue the effort in earnest.”174 Uri Bar-Joseph, also suggests that the decision to
build a nuclear option for Israel was taken following Israel’s withdrawal from the
Sinai after the 1956 War – a withdrawal brought about by American threats to use
economic and political sanctions and Soviet threats to use military force.175 Moreover,
he maintains that it was approved, in secret, by Ben-Gurion and his closest aides –
Perez, who was then general manager of the Ministry of Defence, and Moshe Dayan,
who was Chief of Staff. However, some of the most senior members of Ben-Gurion’s
172
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cabinet, both Mapai ministers and other coalition members, were not even aware of
the details of the new project.176
The behavior of the superpowers and the UN during the Sinai campaign
strengthened Ben-Gurion’s image of world politics. In other words, the Soviet
Union’s threats of direct intervention and attempts to impose UN sanctions against
Israel, US opposition to the Sinai Campaign and its refusal to condone any Israeli
territorial gains, and UN inability to secure peace or to assist Israel in ‘defending
herself’, all seemed to have made it clear to Ben-Gurion that he cannot rely on the
superpowers to support Israel.177 Furthermore, those factors seemed to have illustrated
to Ben-Gurion, the necessity of self-reliance and building a nuclear potential, as
opposed to forging a formal alliance with one of the superpowers – his initial option.
He wrote in 1956: “What Einstein, Oppenheimer and Teller, the three of them were
Jews, did to the United States, could also be done by scientists in Israel for their own
people.”178 Also, Ben-Gurion told the foreign policy committee of MAPAI (his
political party) on 4 March 1958, weeks after work at the Dimona nuclear facility had
begun: “If the Arabs would know that Israel cannot be destroyed, then perhaps there
would be some people among them who would begin thinking that this conflict
should be over, that maybe the time has come to make peace with Israel. The
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prospects of peace with the Arabs depends on strengthening Israel’s power and
security.”179
Shimon Perez – The Nuclear Architect:
The role of Shimon Perez in realizing Israel’s nuclear dreams are as important,
if not more important than that of Ben-Gurion. It was Shimon Perez who persuaded
Ben-Gurion in 1956-57 that the time was right to initiate the nuclear project and,
from the beginning, Perez was entrusted by Ben-Gurion to lead Israel’s pursuit of a
nuclear capability.180 Israel Dostrovsky writes: “There was another individual who
contributed much to decision-making at the time, and this was Shimon Perez. He
personally took it upon himself to promote the issues involved with atomic energy,
particularly the relationship with France which started then. There is no doubt that
because of his great push that he gave to this effort, it was advanced.”181 Perez
himself wrote in 1995 on his role in nuclear decision-making:
“From the outset, I resolved to keep my role entirely out of the public limelight….For
this reason, my name was never included in any formal committee created in the area of
atomic energy. That did not, however, prevent me from effectively running the entire
program on behalf of Ben-Gurion, nor did it impair in any way my authority. Ben-Gurion
trusted me. Professor Bergmann worked with me with no reservations. In time, I was able
to win the trust and confidence of other scientists, engineers and senior personnel
engaged in the project”182

Perez had extensive experience in arms procurement deals and in 1947, at only
twenty-three years of age, he was recruited to the join the Haganah headquarters staff
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in Tel Aviv taking charge of arms procurements deals which he continued to pursue in
higher positions for years to come. In 1953, at age twenty-nine, he was appointed
director-general of the Ministry of Defense, the highest civil servant at the ministry
and running its daily operations.183 It was during this time that he became acquainted
with Bergmann’s nuclear vision, Perez wrote: “I was intrigued as Ben-Gurion and as
enthusiastic as Bergmann.”184 By early 1956, French-Israeli military relations
intensified and their common interest in undermining Nasser, convinced Perez that
France could be the primary source of nuclear assistance. In the end, Perez negotiated
a secret deal with the French for the sale of a nuclear reactor to Israel, in return for
Israel’s participation in the tripartite aggression on Egypt and maybe intelligence
cooperation between the two countries concerning the relations between Egypt and
the Algerian rebels.185 Hence, Perez’ major contribution to Israel’s nuclear program
was his ability to establish Franco-Israeli nuclear cooperation and his role was also
instrumental in selecting some of the project’s scientists and managers.186
The search for arms has been at the core of Perez’ policy orientation and an
integral part of his worldview: “There are only three ‘geographical locations’ where
modern arms can be acquired: The Soviet Union, which withheld arms from Israel
because of her bloc interests, the United States, whose modest sale of Hawk missiles
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reveals that their attitude is significant but not a permanent relationship, we are left
with the European alternative – and this includes France’s attitude…..We have to
build up a deterrent force, both political and military….we must deal with the
problem of military balance”.187
Perez’ quest for arms is closely associated with his belief that Israel cannot
rely for its future survival on the conventional balance of power. Hence, he shares
with Ben-Gurion his pessimism with regards to Israel’s future, his fascination with
nuclear energy and the necessity of establishing a permanent Jewish presence in
Palestine. In his view, Arab quantitative superiority must be neutralized by
introducing nuclear weapons in the security equation – a new qualitative element,
Perez wrote: “The limits of quantitative superiority, and even its end, are more
significant in the security field. The traditional strategy was based on three factors:
quantitative superiority, geographical space and duration of time. But these factors
disappeared with the advent of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and guided
missiles.”188
In Perez’ strategic thinking, “peace” in the Middle East could be brought
about by nuclear weapons. At a press conference in Jordan held on 13 July 1998,
Perez stated that Israel “built a nuclear option in order not to have a Hiroshima but an
Oslo.”189 He believes that Israel’s possession of those weapons, irrespective of
187
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whether the Arabs posses such weapons or not, would inevitably convince the Arabs
with the necessity of accepting Israel and making peace with it. Perez believes that if
both sides possessed such weapons, the logic of nuclear deterrence will be at work:
“the danger of war may be averted…..because the truth is that both sides will be
vulnerable enough not to toy with the idea of war….if both sides had this capability, it
might limit not only the will to commit aggression, but also the danger of war.”190 On
the other hand, he also believes that If Israel unilaterally possessed nuclear weapons,
it would be able to compel the Arabs to make peace with it, under Israel’s terms, and
accept its existence in the region, Perez wrote: “Israel can bring it [peace] closer – if it
convinces the Arabs that with the help of science, we can eliminate their chances of
defeating us, not only in the present but also in the future.”191
Ernest David Bergmann – The Nuclear Scientist:
The role of Bergmann in Israel’s nuclear decision-making was immensely
important, since “for a small and technologically dependent nation in the mid-1950’s
to embark on a nuclear project, more than a leadership’s commitment was required.
There was also a need for scientific and organizational leadership to set goals, devise
strategies, assign tasks, allocate funds, recruit scientists and managers, and oversee
operations. These make the difference between a leader’s vision and a credible
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nuclear-weapon project.”192 It seems that David Bergmann made that difference by
providing the necessary scientific and organizational leadership. Israel Dostrovsky,
who replaced Bergmann at the head of the IAEC in 1966, characterized Bergmann’s
role in this way:
“The role of Professor David Bergmann, Ben-Gurion’s advisor on those issues,
was vital. In my view, Ben-Gurion accepted the judgement of Bergmann without
question. Hence, all suggestions that were brought for discussion must have been
endorsed by Bergmann first, and if Bergmann had been persuaded, Ben-Gurion
would have been as well.”193

Bergmann was made closer to Ben-Gurion in the late 1940’s because of the
latter’s conviction that Israel’s future depended on harnessing science and technology.
In August 1948, Ben-Gurion appointed Bergmann head of the scientific department of
the IDF. On 15 July 1951, Bergmann was made scientific advisor to the Ministry of
Defense, and in early 1952 was appointed director of research of the newly created
Division of Research and Infrastructure (known as EMET) of the Ministry of
Defense. In June 1952, the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission was established, with
Bergmann at its head. He held those three posts until his final resignation in April
1966.194
Bergmann’s worldview was very close to that of David Ben-Gurion and
Shimon Perez. First, Bergmann’s attitudinal prism was also characterized by a belief
in science and technology and their role in developing Israel. Perez describes the
alliance between Ben-Gurion and Bergmann: “Bergmann’s scientific vision was
192
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attracted to Ben-Gurion’s statesmanlike vision, and the plowman met the sower. From
the start a visionary alliance was forged between them over science, defense, and
politics, that marked some of the most fateful moves of the State of Israel.”195 Second,
he shared Ben-Gurion and Perez in their pessimism and extreme sensitivity for the
future security of the State of Israel and saw nuclear weapons as an ultimate guarantor
for the survival of his country in the Middle East amidst relentless ‘Arab hostility’. In
fact, the Holocaust experience seemed to have shaped his worldview, Perez cited him
as saying: “I am convinced that the State of Israel needs a defense research program
of its own, so that we shall never again be as lambs led to the slaughter.”196 In a 1961
letter to Meir Ya’ari, the leader of the left-wing MAPAM, who opposed nuclear
weapons, Bergmann replied:
“I was surprised that a man like you…..is prepared to close his eyes and assume
that reality is how we would all like to see it. There is no person in this country
who does not fear a nuclear war and there is no man in this country who does not
hope that, despite it all, logic will rule in the world of tomorrow. But we are not
allowed to exchange precise knowledge and realistic evaluations for hopes and
illusions. I cannot forget that the Holocaust came on the Jewish people as a
surprise. The Jewish people cannot allow themselves such an illusion for a second
time.”197

Moshe Dayan – The Military Man:
Dayan played a very important role in the development of Israel’s nuclear
weapons program, since he exercised a very strong influence on Israel’s military and
security establishment, and was a follower of Ben-Gurion, “the key figure in the early
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stages of Israel’s nuclear activities.”198 On October 1957, when France agreed to offer
its assistance in constructing the Dimona reactor, Dayan was still serving as Chief of
Staff, of the Israeli army and, as a military man, he received special appreciation
from, and enjoyed a special status with, Ben-Gurion, which inevitably strengthened
his position among Israel’s decision-makers.199 More importantly, Dayan was able to
become Minister of Defense on the eve of the June 1967 War in the coalition
government of Levi Eshkol and maintained his position under the government of
Prime Minister Golda Meir (March 1969-June 1974). Concerning the nuclear
question, Dayan was responsible for moving Israel from the ‘nuclear option’ to an
actual ‘bomb in the basement’ – an existing nuclear-weapons force known, but not
declared to the world. In other words, Dayan managed to convert the nuclear option
espoused by Ben-Gurion, Perez and Bergmann into the actual, albeit unrevealed,
production of nuclear weapons during his term as Minister of Defense and in his
capacity as the highest authority on defense problems in Golda Meir’s Cabinet.200
The importance of Dayan’s achievements lies not only in his role in the
conversion of the Israeli nuclear program from an “option” to an “actual reality”, but
also that he was able to perform that role in successive Israeli governments that were
not necessarily sympathetic to his nuclear vision. Before Dayan joined the coalition
government of Prime Minister Eshkol in the eve of the June 1967 War, Eshkol had
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allowed US representatives to visit Dimona and was considered by many Israelis to
be “soft” on the nuclear issue and to have compromised national sovereignty by
allowing such visits – or so-called ‘nuclear exchanges’.201 Also, Allon was the highest
authority on defense matters and both Rabin and Allon – two pillars of the
conventional school in Israel - exerted a tremendous influence on security and
military thinking in Israel in Eshkol’s government.202 However, Dayan’s assumption
of the Ministry of Defense in 1967 meant that the nuclear program and the security
and military establishment were placed under his authority and Allon eventually had
to acquiesce in the decision to have a ‘bomb in the basement’.203
Dayan’s leadership and decision-making style closely resembles his
preeminent professional experience – the army: “I believe in decisions, not majority
opinions. A consensus is something neutral, which never really leads to a real
decision…..A decision implies risks and of course a lot of people don’t like risks.”204
As for public opinion, “its not a way of making decisions but it’s a way of expressing
things.”205 During the critical stage of the 1973 October War, when it seemed that the
Syrian forces were about to invade behind the ‘green line’, some suggest that Dayan
put the Israeli nuclear force on alert and, if this actually happened, it might explain
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the appearance of a Soviet military supply vessel carrying nuclear warheads in Port
Said on 25 October 1973.206 This illustrates the extent of Dayan’s influence, strong
leadership style and his ability to undertake critical nuclear decisions, sometimes
amidst great odds.
Dayan’s worldview was characterized by an extreme suspicion of the
superpowers and their commitment to protect Israel. In fact, he believed that they
were competing to support the Arabs: “If we have to stand up against one or more of
the Arab states, supported in their attack by the Soviet Union, the United States will
not necessarily help us. On the contrary the two blocks might compete in a shouting
match against us.”207 In another occasion he maintained: “the interpower struggle for
the Arab world increases the total means…..that are being put at the disposal of the
Arab states and also weakens the West’s willingness to oppose the wishes dictated by
their hostility to Israel….The two blocs are outbidding each other in helpfulness to
the Arabs.”208 More specifically, Dayan was concerned with the growing Soviet
involvement in the region in the aftermath of the 1967 War. He saw the United States
as a nation with waning influence, and the USSR as one which is able to take more
risks and hence increase its influence. In fact, Dayan’s views were largely influenced
with Henry Kissinger’s statements after the 1967 War in which he maintained that:
“1. The aim of each American president was to avoid a total world war. 2. the United
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States would not go to war against the USSR for territories occupied by Israel after
1967; 3. The Soviets were aware of this fact.”209
Consequently, Dayan believed in self-reliance and building an indigenous
deterrent force. In 1966 he warned against seeking guarantees from foreign powers.
Israel, he said, should rely on Tzahal (Defense Forces), not on guarantees.210 For him,
the key to Israel’s existence lay in “capitalizing on the anticipated technological
achievements of the 1970’s…..[and] arming the IDF with the equipment of the
future.”211 Note that in this statement, Dayan also emphasized the importance of
science and technology to the future development of Israel – a theme repeated several
times by the previously-mentioned decision-makers.
In this regard, the nuclear option played an important part in Dayan’s strategic
thinking: “Israel must have a deterrent power that will once and for all disillusion the
Arabs of any idea of the conquest and annihilation of Israel.”212 He argued that arms
competition imposes too high a price for Israel. In contrast, the Arabs have greater
human and financial resources to withstand a prolonged conventional conflict.
Nuclear weapons would negate this Arab advantage. Furthermore, Dayan believed
that a nuclear Middle East would lead to a balance of terror and stabilization of the
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conflict.213 This theme was made very clear by Dayan after the 1973 October War, as
he outlined some of his post-war conclusions or strategic assessments:
“Israel had more or less reached its quantitative limits. In the long-run, it will be difficult
for Israel to increase the size of its army, to add a large number of airplanes and tanks (this
means not only a very high financial outlay with the growing sophistication and
development of arms, but also prolonged military service for many young
people…..Therefore, Israel must guarantee the balance of power against the rapidly
expanding Arab military forces by increasing its quality of arms – a quality that will
ensure that every Arab attempt to conquer and destroy Israel will end with the destruction
of its enemies.”214

Uri Bar-Joseph suggests that Dayan was not only worried about developments
in the Arab world, but also sought an “independent Israeli nuclear program [which]
would expand Israel’s freedom of action, especially with regards to the USSR, and
would add some uncertainty to Soviet calculations concerning direct intervention in
the conflict…Furthermore, the Arabs would probably demand that the Soviets supply
them with nuclear weapons; and if the USSR did so, it would violate the NPT,
thereby losing prestige and credibility all over the world, and risking a direct
confrontation with the United States.”215

Bureaucratic Politics and Israel’s Nuclear Decision-Making
In the previous sections, the Israeli nuclear weapons program was represented
as a product of much-needed security and also as a consequence of the attitudinal
prisms of key decision-makers – well-positioned nuclear advocates whose worldview
213

Efraim Inbar, “Israel and Nuclear Weapons Since October 1973,” in Security or Armageddon:

Israel’s Nuclear Strategy ed. Louis Rene Beres. (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986) , 63.
214

215

Bar-Joseph, “The Hidden Debate,” 217.

Ibid., 216.

75

and dedication made the program possible. The main intention of this section is to
illustrate that Israeli nuclear proliferation was not only a product of security or
worldviews/attitudinal prisms, but also a product of organizational and bureaucratic
interests. Perhaps, in the case of Israel, security and worldviews/attitudinal prisms
played a much more important role than bureaucratic politics, yet one must illustrate
that nuclear decision-makers, did not only encourage “extreme perceptions of foreign
threats” due to their worldviews or myth-making abilities216, but also to serve their
personal goals which are, in turn, derived from their organizational or bureaucratic
interests. Also, by shedding light on the role played by bureaucratic actors within the
state, the security model’s assumption concerning state unity would be relaxed.
The lack of detailed information on the motives of those who initiated the
Israeli nuclear program is clearly an obstacle in the way of unraveling important
bureaucratic and organizational insights that might have played a crucial role in
developing Israel’s nuclear program. Nevertheless, several examples are sufficient to
indicate the role that bureaucratic politics played. Bureaucratic theory, if applied to
nuclear decision-making, would argue that the decision to proliferate is made by key
individuals within the scientific or defense bureaucracies of states and those
individuals advocate proliferation in order to enhance the power of their
bureaucracies.217 If applied to the Israeli case, the theory would suggest that Ernest
David Bergmann would qualify, not only as one of the chief “myth-makers” as the
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previous section illustrated, but also a chief bureaucrat whose input as the Chief of
Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), scientific director of the Weizmann
Institute and, since 1949, the chairman of the scientific department of the Haganah
(and later the Ministry of Defense) would qualify him to be regarded as a chief
bureaucrat residing over key scientific establishments.
Moreover, early struggles that involved Bergmann and his opponents, were
clearly of a bureaucratic nature indicating that personal and organizational interests
were at stake. The conflict that took place in the spring and summer of 1951 between
David Bergmann and Chaim Weizmann (Israel’s first president and the founder of the
Weizmann Institute of Science) over the control and funding of the Weizmann
Institute is a case in point.218 Bergmann attempted to change the character of the
institute, by converting its facilities into a HEMED (Scientific Corps, Israeli Ministry
of Defense) base, committing the institute to meet the needs of the scientific
department of the Haganah (later, the Ministry of Defense), of which Bergmann was a
board member, and since 1949, its chairman. Bergmann even proposed “to convert
the Weizmann Institute into Israel’s national scientific center, dedicated to both
civilian and military needs.”219 Thus, Bergmann could be seen as having attempted to
increase his bureaucratic and personal influence by attempting to monopolize most, if
not all, Israeli scientific institutions. This was faced with Weizmann’s opposition
since he did not want his organization to be dependent on funds obtained from BenGurion’s Ministry of Defense – an organization run by his arch political rival. The
218
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conflict between the two reached a dead end, and eventually Weizmann fired
Bergmann in July 1951.
Bergmann later assumed the position of scientific advisor to Ben-Gurion and
created the IAEC in Spring 1952, which was eventually to function, under
Bergmann’s leadership, as a subsidiary of the Ministry of Defense.220 Hence, the
conflict between Bergmann and Weizmann is illustrative of bureaucratic and personal
struggles which took place in Israel in the formative period of Israeli nuclear decisionmaking over the control of key scientific institutions necessary for launching the
nuclear program.
This struggle was then eventually accelerated with the revolt of the nuclear
physicists working for Bergmann in the IAEC and their eventual defection to the
Weizmann Institute during the 1952-1954 period. In fact, the resignation of the
nuclear physicists was as a result of their objection to Bergmann’s strict managerial
style and his effort to monopolize all the scientific and research endeavors for the
purposes of a nuclear program under his leadership. In fact, Bergmann objected to the
physicists’ attempt to establish an academic research program in association with
members of the Hebrew University. In 1952, he set the project’s priorities as follows:
“First, the reactor, then nothing, then education, and at last your research.”221 This
was followed by another attempt by two nuclear physicists – Haber-Schaim and
Yekutieli – to publish a paper in September 1952, without obtaining a security
clearance from Bergmann, and with the Weizmann Institute as their institutional
220
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affiliation, instead of the IAEC.222 Finally, as they were reprimanded by Bergmann,
they insisted on ending their formal relations with the IAEC.
The nuclear physicists were lead by Amos De Shalit, an internationally known
physicist, who was eager to leave the IAEC for the Weizmann Institute and wrote to
Haber-Schaim: “I do not want any contact with Bergmann or dependence on him….I
do not see any reason why the IAEC should have labs of its own, and in my opinion it
would fulfill its mandate if it would take care to meet the needs of the existing
labs.”223 De Shalit formed an alliance with Meyer Weisgall, the Chancellor of the
Weizmann Institute to establish a home there for the whole nuclear physics group.
This request was met well by Meyer, who had an interest in building the Weizmann
Institute as Israel’s preeminent science center by adding a Department of Nuclear
Physics with the Shalit group as its core. Avner Cohen writes: “de Shalit and his
colleagues, who wanted to build a national nuclear physics program, preferred to do
so at the Weizmann Institute, rather than as Bergmann’s pawns at the Ministry of
Defense.”224 When Ben-Gurion assumed the dual position of Prime Minister and
Minister of Defense in 1955, he shared Bergmann’s anger over what had happened
and worked to revitalize the project under Bergmann’s leadership, expressing a
philosophy of self-reliance: “the future of Israel was not dependent on what the
Gentiles would say, but on what the Jews would do…..we must have superiority in
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weapons, because we will never achieve superiority in manpower. All those things
that have to do with science, we must do them.”225 Bergmann and his supporters made
use of Ben-Gurion’s support and were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the
past in selecting scientists on the basis of science alone, but selecting people who
were ready to commit themselves to the top-secret project.226 Avner Cohen writes:
“Another constituency that contributed to the initiation of the nuclear program in 1956-57
was the small group of scientists and engineers concentrated around Machon (Institute) 4.
When Perez and Bergmann began to draw the master plan for the project, based on
obtaining a large production reactor from France and a small research reactor from the
United States, they were helped by a small group of nuclear enthusiasts waiting impatiently
for the age of reactors (Israel Pelah, Ze’ev [Venia] Hadari-Pomerantz, and others). Perez
and Bergmann were also given advice, at times critical, by the nuclear physicists of the
Weizmann Institute (Amos De Shalit, Zvi Lipkin, Igal Talmi, Yekutieli, and others).” 227

Another bureaucratic constituency that was important in Israel’s nuclear
decision-making, albeit much less than the scientific community, was the Israeli
military establishment and its associated military-industrial complex. This
constituency resisted reliance on nuclear deterrence. In an interview, Chief of Staff
General Mordechai Gur said in June 1975 that he did not fear an erosion in Israel’ s
military superiority in the next five to ten years. He explained that Israel’s nuclear
weapons cannot substitute for conventional forces, maintaining that “the State of
Israel and the Jewish people have enough resources – financial and manpower – to
resolve the State’s security problems, based on the political, economic and military
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conditions in which Israel may find herself in the coming years.”228 Also, General
Ariel Sharon, who has occupied top positions in the Israeli defense establishment,
including the position of Minister of Defense, is not in favor of reliance on nuclear
weapons especially if the Middle East moved to a balance-of-terror situation where
both sides posses nuclear weapons. For him, nuclear weapons do not achieve decisive
results in long-term conventional war, ‘terrorist activities’, or wars of attrition. In fact,
they might prevent the achievement of a decisive victory since both sides would be
deterred from going to the point of no return. This would in return lead to a protracted
conflict that would eventually weaken the IDF which is accustomed to short, decisive
battles and not long, protracted wars. As a final argument, Sharon questions the
discretion and ‘rationality’ of some Arab leaders and implies that in a balance-ofterror situation, Arab leaders might not be deterred by Israel’s nuclear potential and
might strike first, resulting in a much more serious escalation than if the conflict was
kept purely conventional.229 Etel Solingen writes:
“Maintaining conventional superiority has been a long-standing objective of the Israeli
Defense Forces. Supporters of an open, full-fledged deterrent often invoked its value as a
means to reduce the need for conventional forces. Such claims represent an institutional
threat to the conventional military. First, they might have exacerbated competition for
dwindling budget resources…..Second, an open deterrent could have threatened the
external network of procurement of conventional weaponry (high performance combat
aircraft in particular). The military establishment was particularly sensitive to the fact that
about 50 percent of the defense budget was covered by US military aid. Third, Israel’s
defense forces would have been required to maintain their conventional deterrent and
fighting missions even in light of diminished capabilities, at potentially much higher
human costs.”230
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Despite the objection of many members of the military-industrial complex, it
seems that their reservations did not stop the nuclear weapons program nor did it
radically restructure Israel’s nuclear policy. As previously mentioned, the debate in
Israel was about how much should Israel rely on nuclear weapons and how far the
nuclear program should go. There was never the suggestion that Israel should
abandon the option altogether. The continuity of Israel’s nuclear program was put to
the test during 1974-77 period under the leadership of Prime Minister Rabin, where
the forces calling for a conventional environment were stronger than ever. Despite
that, the Rabin government did not “institute a reassessment of Israel’s nuclear
policy”, Israel’s nuclear program was probably unaffected and, formally, Israel’s
nuclear policy did not change.231 Probably, the only impact that the conventional
school of thought and the military/industrial complex had on the Israeli nuclear
program was to lower Israel’s nuclear profile and to bolster the already-established
policy of nuclear ambiguity. Solingen argues that the “most relevant groups and
institutions converged in their evaluation on the utility of opaqueness in
accommodating conflicting political interests.”232
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Conclusions
This chapter represented a detailed account of the reasons behind Israel’s
decision to acquire, develop and deploy nuclear weapons and its associated process of
decision-making. It seems clear that the security factor was very much predominant
in Israel’s nuclear thinking and hence tends to overshadow all other explanations.
This is mainly due to the complexity and extensiveness of Israel’s perceived security
threats manifested in the extreme threat of annihilation. Due to that overwhelming
threat, there was no explicit opposition to Israel’s nuclear option by members of
Israel’s political elite or within its key institutions. Despite the fact that proponents of
the conventional school in Israel called for a decreased reliance on nuclear weapons
for security, they did not obstruct the efforts of pro-bomb advocates who worked
relentlessly to develop a nuclear capability. Hence, the only dilemma that had to be
resolved was the degree of Israeli reliance on nuclear weapons and how far it should
go in the nuclear path, and not whether Israel should develop nuclear weapons or not.
In addition, the security model helped to account for the multitude of purposes
that Israel’s nuclear weapons could be used for. As previously mentioned, Israeli
nuclear weapons are not only directed to deter the Arabs from launching a ‘war of
annihilation’ (or ‘liberation’) against Israel, but also for purposes of compellence,
war-making, or as a bargaining chip to nudge opponents and secure political benefits
in negotiations. In addition, the security model helps to explain the reason behind
Israel’s opaque nuclear posture and its policy of ‘deterrence through ambiguity’.
Given the Israeli case, the security model would suggest that the desire to be free
from international pressures calling for inspection on its nuclear installations and the
need to prevent further regional proliferation that an overt posture might lead to –

83

both of which could be considered international or regional security concerns – are
the reasons for Israel’s opacity. Hence, the security model is very effective in
explaining the raison d’etre of Israel’s nuclear program.
Despite its overwhelming utility as a model for the Israeli case, the security
model tends to reduce Israel’s program to the obvious and neglects the domestic
dynamics which played a role in Israel’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact,
Israel’s insecurity is a necessary but insufficient cause for the development of nuclear
weapons. In this regard, the cognitive model helps to account for the actual physical
development of Israel’s program and its transition from a vague utility for security to
a sophisticated reality and a real security asset for the Jewish state. In other words, if
it was not for Israel’s technological-nuclear group, manifested in hard-working, wellpositioned, perseverant, relentlessly dedicated nuclear advocates who used every
possible opportunity to develop nuclear weapons, Israel’s nuclear program would not
have been launched. Moreover, the general quest for scientific prowess among
important decision-makers was definitely an important factor. Hence, understanding
the worldview and general input of those nuclear decision-makers is crucial for
understanding the development of Israel’s nuclear weapons. Moreover, the cognitive
model helps to add to our understanding for the reasons behind Israel’s opaque
posture since it explains its opacity as a compromise between staunch nuclear
advocates who generally supported an overt posture and those who preferred reliance
on conventional weapons.
The bureaucratic approach also serves to open the ‘black-box’ further and
shed light on the various institutions which played a role in nuclear decision-making.
The bureaucratic ‘lens’ puts the decision-maker within his/her institutional context
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and hence the role of the decision-maker becomes more accentuated. This was made
very clear with the role of Bergmann as a key decision-maker residing over critical
scientific establishments. Moreover, his ability – as a skillful bureaucrat – to
monopolize the scientific establishment and overcome bureaucratic dissent might
eventually have been critical for the production of the bomb and realization of Israel’s
nuclear dreams.
However, on balance, Israel’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons was much
more related to its pervasive feelings of insecurity and the presence of well-positioned
‘nuclear myth-makers’ among the political-scientific elite than to bureaucratic factors.
For example, the military as an institution did not seem to greatly influence Israel’s
nuclear program. Despite its general opposition to reliance on nuclear weapons, the
military worked only to bolster the already-existing position of nuclear ambiguity and
did not add anything new to Israel’s nuclear politics which, in any case, was already
more affected by the pervasive security crisis which it faced and the boldness of that
country’s nuclear advocates.
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CHAPTER 3
INDIA – INTERNATIONAL IMPERATIVES OR DOMESTIC FACTORS?

This chapter will examine the reasons behind India’s choice of nuclear
weapons and its preferred nuclear strategies. The Indian case of nuclear proliferation
derives its importance from the ongoing political and academic discourse concerning
Indian nuclear decision-making and the factors which played a role in such a process.
Recently, this “puzzle” has been made more intriguing due to the nuclear tests
conducted by India in May 1998. First, the chapter will examine the structural
features of the South-Asian regional system. Second, it will attempt to illustrate the
security threats which India faces and relate them to India’s decision to acquire
nuclear weapons. Third, it will attempt to shed light on the domestic dimension of
India’s nuclear politics – the role of nuclear “myth-makers”, bureaucratic politics and
the role played by normative concerns such as prestige and science. In other words,
one must place India’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons “within the overall
context of India’s foreign policy objectives as well to examine the…..domestic and
external compulsions faced by New Delhi.”233 As in the previous chapter, the focus
will be on the formative period of India’s nuclear program – the period between 1947
and 1974 – the year in which India exploded its first nuclear bomb dubbed “The
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion” or PNE. However, it will refer to other events that might
have had a significant impact on India’s nuclear decision-making in the pre-1948
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period or in the post-1974 period. In this light, it remains to be seen whether the May
1998 tests represent a break from India’s past nuclear politics or simply “business as
usual” – a continuation of India’s international and domestic nuclear dilemmas.

India and the South Asian System
In order for one to understand India’s threat perceptions and hence delve into
the security threats that it faces, one must explain the structural features of the South
Asian regional system. First, the structure and distribution of power in South Asia is
difficult to precisely define. On the one hand, Ashok Kapur and Jeyaratnam Wilson
argue that the distribution of power (broadly defined in terms of a country’s economic
strength; its scientific and technological growth; its capacity to solve internal and
external problems; its political unity and capacity to accommodate conflicting
pressures and so on) has always favored India. They explain that this has lead to the
development of an asymmetrical distribution of military power that has resulted in a
unipolar regional order lead by India – a hegemon that seemingly cannot be
challenged neither by Pakistan nor by a combination of South Asian states.234 On the
other hand, Barry Buzan sees the South Asian system as a bipolar one dominated by
both India and Pakistan which are “two large states whose insecurities are deeply
intertwined that their national securities, particularly in terms of political and military
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security, cannot be separated.”235 He maintains that a number of much less powerful
states are bound into the security equation for geographical reasons – those are
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. However, he suggests that China, although
an important actor in the South Asian regional system, is not part of this security
complex “because South Asia is relatively peripheral to its primary security
concerns.”236 The view of the system as a bipolar one, is further supported by
Mohamed Ayoob who argues that India might possess regional preeminence
(measured by objective criteria) but lacks regional predominance’ if measured by
other states’ acceptance of such a role as legitimate. He maintains that Pakistan’s
ability to “borrow power from abroad” – mainly from the US and China – has enabled
it to maintain a position of ‘near-parity’ with India in military terms.237
Concerning the nuclear issue, it is important to see the Indo-Pakistani and the
Sino-Indian conflict as central ones to India’s security equation. Moreover, those
conflicts are not only real challenges and serious threats to India, but they also define
and structure the regional distribution of power. In this sense, one could see a tripolar
regional system centered around China, India and Pakistan and their corresponding
Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Chinese conflicts. This perception of the regional framework
stands in stark contrast to the perception which sees a unipolar system lead by a
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strong, hegemonic India that can deal easily with its regional adversaries.238
Moreover, the notion of a bipolar system centered around India and Pakistan with the
underestimation of the China factor reflects simplicity and an inability to understand
more complex interactions among regional adversaries. Brahma Chellaney maintains
that one possible explanation for the neglect of China in writings on South Asia is that
many analysts trained in American academia “have usually been trained in the SovietAmerican deterrence model with its two rival and balancing forces. There is a
tendency, therefore, to extend that analytical model to conflicts and problem
elsewhere in the world, and thus to see issues simplistically in a one-to-one
framework.”239 Moreover, Chellaney argues that “having divided the world into a
number of regions, these scholars find it somewhat analytically problematic to
introduce an ‘outside’ country into their regional framework. China is not seen as
belonging to South Asia…..Its role is only seen as peripheral…..This view, naturally,
misses much that is crucial to a real understanding of the underlying issues.”240
Moreover, the region witnessed strong superpower influence due to the fact
that regional powers sought superpower help to solve their security problems and
balance against their adversaries. This is exemplified in the American commitment to
Pakistan during the Cold War– a commitment that helped “assuage that country’s
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security concerns.”241 In response, India, a champion of the non-alignment movement,
signed in 1971 a twenty-year friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. In this sense,
the American-Chinese-Pakistani alliance and the corresponding Indo-Soviet one,
polarized the sub-continent and even raised doubts about the credibility of India’s
cherished non-aligned stance.242
Another important characteristic of the South Asian regional system is the
permeability of boundaries between the states of the system. In other words, the
“physical boundaries of South Asia are porous in several key areas: drug trade, arms
trade, missiles and nuclear activities and supply relations, and the patterns of
diplomatic and military alignments among key players. India and Pakistan and the
personalities and institutions inside India and Pakistan who deal with diplomatic,
military, nuclear and intelligence affairs have to work with a matrix of challenges and
opportunities in a porous ‘South Asian’ world.”243

The Security Perspective
In order to understand the security imperative in India’s strategic calculations
in the nuclear arena, one must appreciate the unique situation of India among states in
the current international system and the persistent security threats that it faces on the
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regional level. This understanding of India’s strategic behavior and threat perception
is in line with neorealist thinking. Robert Jervis has identified two characteristics of a
systemic approach that are relevant in this analytical context. First, units within a
system are interconnected, i.e. changes in one part of the system produces change in
other parts. Second, relations between any two actors are conditioned in part by the
relations between each of them and other actors in the international system.244
In this context, the term “systemic” refers to the larger international system,
especially the power relationships among major actors and between them and all the
other actors. The term “sub-systemic” is used for interactions limited to a specific
regional system. In this light, India’s threat perceptions could be seen as operating on
two levels: the “systemic” level explains India’s behavior in terms of its position in
the international system and how it responds to the superpowers and the “subsystemic” level focuses on power relations between regional powers (namely Pakistan
and China).
There are two distinct qualities in India’s foreign policy and strategy. The first
“expresses a sensitivity to world-order concerns – to alter the gap between the
‘developing’ nations and the superpowers and to reduce great-power imperialism. The
second expresses a sensitivity about Indian security – to shape India’s position in the
South Asian and the Asian balance of power, to shape international arms control and
nuclear policies, to pursue Indian interests through non-alignment and peaceful
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coexistence.”245 Given this framework, India’s nuclear weapons program will be seen
as a response to the systemic threat that it faces from the superpowers (especially the
United States) and the regional or sub-systemic threat manifested in China and
Pakistan. Those threats should not be seen as somehow isolated or separate from each
other, but are very much interrelated due to the complex interactions between India
and its adversaries. In other words, systemic and sub-systemic actors interact with one
another to influence India’s strategic environment.
The Chinese threat to India is considered the primary motivation for the Indian
nuclear program. More importantly, the framework of Sino-Indian relations in the
formative period of India’s nuclear program was defined by China’s occupation of the
Tibet, on India’s northern border, in 1950. This greatly alarmed the Indian leadership
“in classic geostrategic terms: the large neighbor had extended its reach. Yet newly
independent and poor India had few means with which to deal with the changed
circumstances.”246 Nevertheless, India had tried, through a policy of constructive
engagement, to court the Chinese. Nehru and Chou-En-lai exchanged visits later in
1954 and each leader received warm and enthusiastic welcomes, yet beneath the
surface lay the lingering dispute over three regions totaling 50,000 square miles of
territory that Chinese maps recorded as Chinese and Indian maps recorded as
Indian.247 The territorial dispute became more apparent in January 1959 when Chou
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En-lai wrote Nehru to officially claim the disputed three regions for China. This was
coupled with the Tibetan rebellion against Chinese rule, which resulted in the flight of
the Dalai Lama to India. Indo-Chinese tensions escalated and negotiations were
fruitless. In the meantime, China was racing to build atomic weapons and the Soviet
Union signed an agreement with China in October 15, 1957 pledging to supply it with
a prototype atom bomb.248
A turning point in Indian strategic thinking came in the aftermath of the SinoIndian border war of October 1962. After invading India along the Himalayan border,
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army routed the ill-equipped and ill-prepared Indian
army and came to occupy some 4,000 square miles of territory. The Chinese then
declared a unilateral cease-fire after achieving their territorial objectives, thereby
humiliating Nehru and the Indian political leadership.249 Nehru had taken many
measures to avoid the conflict with China: “In 1952, he readily ceded India’s
extraterritorial privileges in Tibet inherited from the British colonial period, and had
championed China’s entry to the United Nations.”250 The border war “forced Nehru to
reappraise his strategy and his most cherished ideals.”251 Moreover, it resulted in a
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situation where “the country’s military weakness was exposed, and the Himalayas no
longer were viewed as an impregnable barrier to invasion.”252
The threat to India’s security became more pronounced with the first Chinese
nuclear test at Lop Nor on October 16, 1964. This lead to a firestorm of controversy in
India as segments of India’s political and scientific establishments pushed for the
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Sisir Gupta, one of India’s ablest diplomats,
expressed the concerns of most Indian strategists: “without using its nuclear weapons
and without unleashing the kind of war which would be regarded in the West as the
crossing of the provocation threshold, China may subject a non-nuclear India to
periodic blackmail, weaken its people’s spirit of resistance and self-confidence, and
thus achieve without a war its major political and military objectives in Asia.”253
Some also argue that “until the detonation of the Chinese nuclear device, India’s
security requirements had been defined exclusively in terms of conventional
weaponry…..Yet the prospect of a neighboring Asian power acquiring nuclear
weapons, coming so soon after that country’s decisive military victory over India,
sparked renewed discussion of India’s security….there were widespread calls for
India’s development of nuclear weapons….Only India’s nuclear capabilities could
elevate India to a position where it could not be subject to Chinese nuclear
coercion.”254 In addition, while leading politicians recognized the value of a
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superpower‘s guarantee to their country’s security, they were also afraid that such a
guarantee would compromise their country’s non-aligned status. In any event, Indian
efforts to obtain a superpower’s guarantee against China’s bomb failed.255
The Kashmir dispute is generally considered the primary motivation behind
the Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition and hence figures high in India’s strategic
calculations.256 In fact, some argue that a crisis in Kashmir could trigger a fourth
Indo-Pakistani war that might escalate to the nuclear level.257 Nevertheless, neither
India nor Pakistan initially decided to have nuclear weapons because of the territorial
conflict in Kashmir. However, this does not mean that the overall Pakistani threat to
India did not play an important role in India’s strategic calculations – a role that
seemed to increase over time. In fact, the “history and feature of arms control and
non-proliferation in South Asia must be examined in the context of divergent, and
apparently non-negotiable conceptions of national security and raison d’etre of the
two states and societies….For Indian strategic thinkers, South Asia…..is part of an
unstable, volatile neighborhood, and future enmities cannot be fully anticipated.”258
In this light, the problem of Kashmir could be perceived as “a symbol of the
clash between the secular self-perception of much of the Indian elite and
communal/religious self-perception of their counterparts in Pakistan. The Kashmir
255

Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow,” 54.

256

Carranza, “Rethinking Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Relations,” 567.

257

Ibid., 567 ; Carranza mentions that this prediction was made by former CIA Director James

Woolsey in a testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, February 24, 1993.
258

Ashok Kapur, “Nuclear Development of India and Pakistan,” 143.

95

issue, therefore, is not just a bilateral territorial dispute between two neighbors. It is
intimately linked to the self-definition of the Indian and Pakistani states.”259
Pakistan’s leaders have argued that Pakistan remains “incomplete” without Kashmir
because of its predominantly Muslim population and its territorial contiguity. On the
other hand, India sought to demonstrate Kashmir’s secular status and claimed to hold
Kashmir for purposes of “nation-building and national cohesion.”260
This should also be coupled with Pakistan’s relentless quest for nuclear
weapons. In fact, Pakistan established its Atomic Energy Commission in 1956. In
August 1960, the United States gave Pakistan $350,000 to prepare for a first research
reactor. In 1962, Pakistan signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation with France,
which in the 1970s would seek to supply Pakistan with a plutonium production
reactor and separation plant. This was coupled with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s appreciation
of modern science and technology, and particularly nuclear capability. He began to
speak of the need for Pakistani nuclear weapons in 1965 and launched a program to
acquire this capability in 1972.261
The Indo-Pakistani conflict should be understood in the context of India’s
foreign policy goals and the role which India has assigned for itself. India perceives
itself much as the United States has traditionally perceived itself in relation to the
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Americas.262 In fact, the ‘Indira Doctrine’ named after Prime Minister Indira Ghandi
is a clear manifestation of India’s quest for regional hegemony and its self-perception
as the strategic and political manager of the Indian subcontinent. The ‘Indira
Doctrine’ stipulates that “India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any
states in the region, unless requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention by an
outside power; if external assistance is needed to meet an internal crisis, states should
look first within the region for help.”263 This is seen as an Indian version of the
‘Monroe Doctrine’.264
Since their emergence as independent states, India and Pakistan have fought
each other in three wars, in 1947-1948, 1965 and 1971. The importance of nuclear
weapons becomes clear if one notes the struggle for power between India and
Pakistan over the control of the subcontinent. In this regard, India might have seen
that its possession of nuclear weapons would play a role in signaling to Pakistan – the
regional “spoiler” in India’s perceptions265 – that India is more powerful.
The Pakistani factor in India’s nuclear calculations was made clear in the
aftermath of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war in which India was victorious. The Tashkent
Declaration of January 10, 1966 was seen by many Indians as a humiliating one that
returned to Pakistan the territorial gains made by India during the war. The Soviet262
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mediated talks in Tashkent resulted in an agreement that “called for both sides to
withdraw their forces to positions held prior to August 5, 1965 and to repatriate
prisoners of war. Both sides pledged not to have recourse to force and to settle their
disputes through peaceful means.”266 However, the Tashkent Declaration failed to
resolve the fundamental problem of Kashmir, stating merely “that Jammu and
Kashmir was discussed, and each of the two sides set forth its respective position.”267
George Perkovich writes: “Paradoxically, the victory over Pakistan triggered renewed
demands in India for nuclear weapons. The day before the cease-fire took effect,
nearly one hundred members of Parliament from multiple parties, including Congress,
issued a letter urging the prime minister to decide immediately to develop nuclear
weapons.”268
The Chinese role in the 1965 war was also an important factor in the IndoPakistani strategic equation. In fact, many suggest that the Chinese ultimatum to India
in 1965 and Pakistani-Chinese collaboration, alarmed the Indians more than the
Pakistani threat in its own right.269 According to Indian defense analyst, K.
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Subrahmanyam, the Chinese threat to India could take a more indirect form: “If China
can transfer nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan and thereby countervail
India, there is no need for China to pose a [direct] threat to India…..China’s ambition
is to replace the U.S. as the primary hegemonic power in Asia and in that perspective
China looks at India as a regional player to be offset by Pakistan. This is a very
sophisticated Chinese challenge to India and not a crude military threat.”270 The
Chinese threat to India was made more apparent in the words of Raju Thomas:
“The Chinese military ultimatum to India during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, and the
continuation of the Chinese atomic tests thereafter, reinforced the case of the pro-bomb
lobby in India. The basic argument was that, even if Chinese nuclear weapons
development was directed mainly against the Soviet Union, there was no guarantee that
China would not resort to (perhaps veiled) nuclear blackmail during the times of crisis on
the subcontinent. Especially in view of the unexpectedness of the Sino-Indian war of
1962, proponents of the bomb maintained the nuclear contingency should be taken into
account in Indian defense preparations: according to this argument, maintaining ten
mountain divisions – as India had done since 1963 – may prove to be futile if the
conventional threat from the north were to escalate to a nuclear level in future SinoIndian confrontations.”271

Hence, Pakistan’s ability to “borrow power from external patrons and thus to
neutralize to a substantial extent India’s inherent superiority in South Asia”, was
significant in India’s strategic calculations.272 Pakistani nuclear ambitions attracted
greater attention after 1980 with growing reports about Pakistan’s attempts to achieve
nuclear weapons capability. Clandestine Pakistani nuclear weapons activities were
highlighted, as were the activities of the scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and his
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‘theft’ of critical secrets regarding enrichment technology from the Dutch firm of
UNRECO.273 In this regard, Pakistani nuclear aspirations could be traced to Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto’s statements on nuclear weapons in the mid-1960’s and his decision to
acquire such weapons in 1972.
The role of the great powers especially that of the United States concerning
the enforcement of the non-proliferation treaty was seen by many as posing a strategic
threat to India since it did not address India’s major security concerns and was seen as
encroachment upon India’s sovereignty. In fact, Stephen Cohen, commenting on the
policies to arrest nuclear proliferation in South Asia, wrote: “Policies which are
merely self-serving are self-defeating when they do not address the enlightened selfinterest of other states as well.”274 This theme was reiterated several times by many
Indian politicians and analysts alike. In an April 18, 1967 meeting between Defense
Minister Robert McNamara, the Indian prime minister secretary, L.K. Jha cited the
security problem vis-à-vis China as the main reason for India’s refusal to sign.
Moreover, the then Head of India’s Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), Vikram
Sarabhai, maintained that “if the United States and the Soviet Union were not
prepared to make nuclear disarmament ‘the next step’ and if China would not sign the
NPT, then India is reluctant to give up the option of building the bomb….the present
NPT is not ‘salable’ in India….the developing international nuclear situation
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possesses the characteristics of a Greek tragedy in which the actors are drawn
inexorably to fates which they are seeking to avoid.”275 As former head of India’s
Atomic Energy Commission, Raja Ramanna, put it: “These nations chose to ignore
the fact that by enforcing non-proliferation, they, along with the advanced nations,
were asking us to give up part of our national sovereignty, something which we had
won after years of sustained struggle.”276 This was also complicated by the fact that
both the United States and the Soviet Union proved unwilling during the 1960’s and
1970’s to provide any robust nuclear security guarantees to India to reduce its fears
from a Chinese nuclear threat.277
When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was put to a vote on June 12,
1968, India voiced its “nay”. Indira Ghandi summed up the situation accordingly
saying that “the Parliament and the public do not seem to be ready for India to sign
the treaty, no one seems to want it.”278 Indian suspicion towards the great powers was
due to the fact that the most intense pressure on behalf of the treaty came from the
greatest capitalist powers, the United States, and from India’s former colonial master,
the United Kingdom. Also, the recent food and rupee devaluation wrangles with the
United States deepened India’s resentment of the United States and increased its
defiance to its dictates. As Homi Sethna put it:
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“There were pressures on India to sign the NPT around 1967…..You see something else
had happened recently. We were told [in 1966] to devalue the rupee, which we did. We
were told that money would flow once we devalued, and it would all be milk and honey.
But money did not flow in. So that was when we became extremely suspicious of the
U.S. advice about what was in our interest.”279

Another watershed event in Indian-American relations was in 1971 when the
United States attempted to pressure India through gunboat diplomacy. The
deployment of the USS Enterprise and nine supporting warships to the Bay of Bengal
during the war between India and Pakistan is cited by some Indian polemicists as an
example of why India must have a nuclear arsenal of its own.280 This was done after
Prime Minister Ghandi authorized Indian forces to cross the border to pursue
Pakistani forces, Kissinger and Nixon took this as reaffirmation that India was the
aggressor determined to escalate the conflict in a strategy to disintegrate West
Pakistan. The United States on December 2 announced the suspension of military
sales to India and later froze economic assistance. On December 10, the battleships
were deployed. The heavy-handed role played by Nixon and Kissinger in the 1971
Indo-Pakistani war was interpreted by India as constituting a major strategic threat to
its security. Despite the fact that this deployment was not mainly directed against
India but was largely an attempt to signal forcefulness to the Soviet Union to prevent
it from intervening on India’s behalf against a presumed Chinese military assistance
to Pakistan, Mrs. Ghandi felt that the United States
279
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“had ignored India’s basic interests, tried to create parity of strength between India and
Pakistan, pumped large-scale armament to Islamabad and fanned the embers of an arms
race in the region. It had given considerable economic assistance to India but had always
attempted to trade it off for political leverage…..Washington did not look kindly upon
strong, independent countries in Asia, did not apparently wish to see the emergence of a
strong India.”281

India’s Nuclear Decision-Making
From the previous analysis, one could infer that the reasons for India’s nuclear
weapons are purely strategic-rational. In other words, India developed nuclear
weapons in order to face the burgeoning security threats that it faces from China,
Pakistan and the United States. Those countries are seen, in one way or another, to be
infringing upon India’s national security or national sovereignty, either through
posing a direct military threat as the case is with Pakistan and China, or a more
implicit threat as exemplified by the United States and its attempts to enforce nonproliferation, its support for Pakistan, or its willingness and demonstrated ability to
influence regional conflicts – conflicts which are perceived by India to lie exclusively
within its domain. This explanation falls neatly in the realm of “Structural Realism,
arguably the most influential theory in the international relations field, [which]
predicts or explains that states in an anarchic international environment will seek to
maximize their power for self-preservation or,…..their security. If an adversary or
adversaries posses nuclear weapons, or appear likely to in the future, a state would be
expected to seek nuclear capability to balance that threat in the absence of alternative
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means.”282 This would suggest that the main reason for India’s capability would be to
prevent US infringement on India’s national sovereignty as defined by New Delhi
and, more importantly, to counterbalance the immediate nuclear threat from China
and the expected one from Pakistan.
The security explanation for India’s decision to proliferate is quite useful, yet
it leaves several questions unanswered. If India’s 1974 nuclear test was a response to
China’s 1964 test, then why did India wait for ten years in order to conduct its own
test, when it could have done so much earlier ? In response to this question, some
argue that Indira Ghandi was faced with internal unrest and dissatisfaction by 19731974. Hence, she decided to conduct those tests in order to restore faith in her
leadership and the nation more generally.283 But then again, why would a nuclear
explosion be the means by which a political leader seeks to restore faith in his/her
leadership ? More importantly, irrespective of the timing of the nuclear test, what was
so compelling about a nuclear explosion that would give a government the popular
legitimacy it sought ? What did nuclear weapons represent to India in general and to
the Indian elite in particular ? Clearly, the answers to these questions move the focus
away from momentary security concerns to the realm of well established, consciousshaping ideas and norms and their role in the decision-making process.
The intention here is not to suggest that India’s nuclear program should be
seen as somehow aloof from the security threats that the country faced, but rather that
multicausality is behind India’s nuclear weapons program. In this light, India’s
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nuclear weapons program could be seen also as a result of the presence of pivotal
nuclear myth-makers, whose worldviews and contribution to the program made it
possible. Besides security reasons, India’s decision-makers perceived nuclear
weapons as a symbol of the nation’s achievement of “scientific-technical prowess and
national sovereignty and establish India’s membership in the aristocracy of nuclear
states who set the standards of international rank. India also perceives the U.S.-led
nonproliferation regime as a racist, colonial project to deny India the fruits of its own
labor and the tools of its security.”284 This entails that the security approach must be
balanced with the study of the attitudinal prisms of the decision-makers and how they
perceived nuclear weapons as symbols of modernity, identity and prestige. In fact, the
quest for nuclear power and fascination with atomic energy was a dominant theme
among many Indians long before any security threats emerged to drastically alter
India’s strategic environment.285 Hence, by illustrating the role played by the
subjective perceptions of prominent ‘nuclear myth-makers’ within the Indian
political-scientific elite, one would have relaxed the assumption of the self-interested,
rational nation-state inherent in the security model.
Furthermore, bureaucratic politics played also an important role in nuclear
decision-making. As key bureaucrats, Homi Bhabha, Vikram Sarabhai, Raja
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Ramanna, and Homi Sethna undoubtedly played a pivotal role in nuclear decisionmaking through their manipulation of the scientific-technological apparatus under
their control – the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). By shedding light on
the role played by bureaucratic actors within the state, the assumption of state unity
inherent in the security model would be relaxed.
Decision-making on nuclear issues in India is marred with ambiguity and
complexity. No agency or department is solely responsible for coordinating policy
formulation on security issues, including the nuclear one. In fact, for the period under
research, no White Paper has ever been published on India’s nuclear policy, nor does
there seem to be a secret strategy on which specific policies are conducted.286 K.
Subrahmanyam, a former Secretary of Defense Production in the Indian government,
argued that “the absence of strategic tradition has resulted in ad-hocism all around.”287
In an Indo-US academic conference he added:
“As a consistent advocate of the nuclear option for India during the last quarter of a
century and as a person very familiar with the general thinking at the top levels of
military and bureaucratic leadership, though not privy to their secrets, I despair whether
the India establishment can be persuaded to apply their minds at all to a nuclear strategic
policy.”288

This ambiguity in India’s nuclear decision-making makes it extremely difficult
for the researcher to precisely identify the turning points in India’s nuclear program.
Also, India’s nuclear position seems contradictory and incoherent. This contradiction
stems from the fact that India is known to have been working ambitiously to develop
286
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nuclear weapons, yet surprisingly most of the rhetoric of India’s politicians mostly
emphasizes themes of non-proliferation and disarmament.289
In order to clarify this ambiguity and to make sense out of India’s seemingly
contradictory nuclear position, several important points should be made concerning
India’s nuclear policy: First, India’s nuclear paradigm is associated with the fact that
India should develop the option to deploy nuclear weapons. India’s nuclear weapons
policy should remain “open-ended and ambiguous, offering both the lure of
disarmament and the threat of armament. This position satisfied the popular desire
that India would one day become a great power primus inter pares, while allowing it
to limit the costs to the domestic economy and its foreign relations…..Furthermore, it
allowed India to pursue nuclear weapons while still claiming the moral high
ground.”290 Secondly, India worked to become self-reliant in nuclear-weapon
technology by gradually accumulating, mainly through indigenous effort, the
capabilities that allow it to assemble an effective nuclear deterrent should the need
arise.291 India’s nuclear efforts mainly concentrated on research and development of
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nuclear devices. Third, India believed that its capacities to produce weapons-grade
material should be established outside international safeguards in order to maintain its
freedom on nuclear development without international scrutiny or inspection.292
Hence, when analyzing India’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons one must note
that that decision was usually an ambiguous one geared towards keeping the option
open as opposed to overt weaponization. In other words, decisions concerning the
Indian nuclear program in the period between 1947-1974 were directed towards
“keeping the option [open], but not developing a deployable nuclear force.”293

The Cognitive Approach to Decision-Making – Norms, Identity, and Nuclear
Weapons

This section will focus on the process of nuclear decision-making as it is
related to the attitudinal prisms and worldviews of the nuclear decision-makers
themselves. Moreover, it will attempt to link important norms such as science,
modernity, and prestige to the worldviews of decision-makers and to see how they
shaped the normative essence of the prominent members of the Indian elite.
Furthermore, it will seek to illustrate the importance of the beliefs and images of the
decision-makers in directing India’s nuclear program.

a core group – especially in the Departments of Atomic Energy and Space – that compares well with
the best in the world.
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In terms of nuclear decision-making, the worldviews of the Prime Ministers,
especially that of Nehru, and the Heads of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission
(IAEC), especially that of Homi Bhabha – the founder of India’s nuclear program –
are undoubtedly the most important. This is largely due to the fact that “in India, the
Atomic Energy Department is treated as a sacred cow…..Its nuclear policy and atomic
energy program is controlled by a closed circuit of powerful groups of vested
interests, comfortably protected by the Atomic Energy Act of 1962. This Act confers
total power to initiate plans, execute and regulate everything relating to nuclear
activities in India upon a single man – the Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission, who is accountable only to the Prime Minister. The Department can
refuse public access to any information relating to existing and/or planned nuclear
projects.”294
Even the Ministry of External Affairs, usually considered an important unit in
any country’s nuclear decision-making, has been particularly wary because the IAEC
shares little information with it about the actual state of the country’s nuclear
program.295 This closed decision-making process has been criticized as ‘scientific and
political tsarism’ or as a virtual ‘nuclear sub-government’ where only a handful of
decision-makers mattered.296 In fact, “very few non-scientists other than the Prime
Minister know the exact nature of the country’s nuclear program.”297
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This section will mainly focus on the worldviews of Nehru – the nation’s
supreme political leader since independence and the Prime Minister from 1947 till his
death in 1964, and Homi Bhabha, India’s leading nuclear scientist, and Head of the
IAEC from its creation in 1948 till his death in 1966.
In order to further conceptualize the important role that decision-makers have
on nuclear decisions, one must recognize the effect of leadership transitions on India’s
program. As Peter Lavoy said: “The nuclear myths of a state’s political and military
leaders determine whether that state will launch a nuclear weapons program. When
those myths change [in this case with leadership transitions], military nuclear
behavior also is likely to change.”298 This will be examined briefly at the end of this
section by illustrating the impact that the death of Bhabha had on nuclear decisionmaking and the way in which the views of Vikram Sarabhai, Raja Ramanna and Homi
Sethna – subsequent heads of the IAEC – influenced nuclear decision-making in the
period between 1966 and 1974 – the year in which India conducted its first nuclear
test.

Nehru and Bhabha – The Political Leader Meets the Scientist:
The contribution of both Nehru and Bhabha is extremely important in
understanding India’s nuclear decision-making since both individuals laid the
scientific and political base for the nuclear project to materialize. Ashok Kapur wrote
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about India’s intragovernmental nuclear debate: “It centered on the official
relationship and personal friendship between Indian Prime Minister Nehru and the
distinguished scientist, and subsequently first chief of the Indian Atomic Energy
Commission, Dr. Homi Bhabha. Up to 1964 these two personalities symbolized the
two facets of India’s disarmament and security policies.”299

Nehru - The Political Leader:
Nehru’s thinking on nuclear matters is quite ambiguous. His rejection of
‘absolute power’ and his willingness to accept ‘relative power’, left unanswered the
exact meaning, the nature, of the latter. It indicated however, that “Nehru is not a
peacenik as is sometimes imagined.”300 Nehru rejected the view that absolute military
power counted, and this seemed to underlie his view of India’s position vis-à-vis the
superpowers and China. He never took the view that the superpowers could perform
better just because of their superior strategic capabilities. However, at the same time,
he “did not regard influence-building activity as simply a product of ‘talk’ – of
expressing moral concerns – unless this was accompanied by material strength.”301 In
his far-ranging speech to the Indian Parliament on February 15, 1955, Nehru
expressed the need for a ‘materially’ strong India:
“We feel, in so far as international policy is concerned, that right and wrong counts. But
it is not the righteousness of a proposition that makes it listened to but rather the person
or the country which says so and the strength behind that country…..In this nuclear age
299
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the only countries that count from the point of view of nuclear war, are those countries
which are, unfortunately, in a position to use these bombs.”302

While Nehru preferred that security policies be pursued through the
development of proper policies and diplomatic means, a connection between
diplomacy and military force was also made.303 More importantly concerning the
nuclear question, the use of force as a last resort was permissible “particularly if force
is used to alter discrimination against the have-nots and protect Indian interests.”304
For Nehru, not only because a policy is morally “right” or “wrong” it should be
endorsed, rather what mattered was the strategic utility of that policy as it relates to
national policy goals. In this connection the difference between Nehru’s and Ghandi’s
thinking could be illustrated – to quote Nehru:
“…..but for us and for the National Congress as a whole, the non-violent method was not,
and could not be a religion or an unchallenged creed or dogma. It could only be a policy
and a method promising certain results, and by these results it would have to be finally
judged.”305

Within Nehru’s worldview, the atom occupied a preeminent position as a sign
of a new era of human civilization. Furthermore, India’s weakness and its
susceptibility to colonialism was, according to him, a product of its lack of
technological sophistication: “But we are on the verge I think of a tremendous
development in some direction of the human race. Consider the past few hundred
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years of human history: the world developed a new source of power, that is steam –
the steam engine and the like – and the industrial age came in. India with all her many
virtues did not develop that source of power. It became a backward country because
of that…..But an enormous new power came in. Now we are facing the atomic age;
we are on the verge of it. And this is something infinitely more powerful than either
steam or electricity.”306 In this regard, one could see how, in Nehru’s worldview,
nuclear power became synonymous with prestige, technological advancement and
freedom from colonialism – part of the post-colonial project intended to bring India
back to the forefront.
Moreover, Nehru spoke of “the relationship between science and
development, and of atomic energy to war using the term ‘science’ in two very
different ways but consistent with the larger objectives of the post-colonial
project.”307 On one hand, he urged the scientists to think in terms of the larger
community and to put their energies for the general purposes of national
development: “So science must think in terms of the 400 million people in India….it
is because we forget the scientific approach that many of our troubles arise.”308
However, even as Nehru hoped for the peaceful use of nuclear energy for
national development, the association of war and science was never far from his
mind: “I know how difficult it is for a line to be drawn between scientific work for
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peace and war. This great force that has suddenly come about through scientific
research may be used for war and may be used for peace. We cannot neglect it
because it may be used for war…..we shall develop it.”309 On another occasion,
Nehru highlighted his willingness to use nuclear energy for war: “Of course if we are
compelled to use atomic energy for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of
any of us will stop the nation from using it that way. But I do hope that our outlook in
regard to this atomic energy is going to be a peaceful one…..and not one of war and
hatred.”310
By the time of the Constituent Assembly Debates on Atomic Energy (1948),
the public association of atomic energy and national defense was so strong that Nehru
could not begin his introductory speech but by noting that congruence. Itty Ibraham
writes: “The atomic bombs that had forced Japan to surrender and ended the Second
World War just a few years before had left a powerful impression on the minds of the
nationalist leaders, reinforcing the power of science for state ends, and India’s own
shortcomings in this regard.”311 Nehru wrote to the Cabinet as early as 1946:
“Modern defense and modern industry require scientific research both on a broad
scale and in highly specialized ways. If India has not got qualified scientists and upto-date scientific institutions in large numbers, it must remain a weak country
incapable of playing a primary part in a war.” The note goes on to argue that the state

309

Ibid., 47.

310

Ibid., 49.

311

Ibid., 48.

114

should set up both a scientific manpower committee (‘the broad scale’) and an
Atomic Energy Commission (‘highly specialized ways’).312
Hence, one could infer from Nehru’s early speeches and actions that India’s
nuclear program had a military component from the moment of its inception. This
was clear when Nehru, in 1948, introduced before the Constituent Assembly an
Atomic Energy Act to create an Atomic Energy Commission and the legal framework
for its operation. The act was modeled on the British Atomic Energy Act but imposed
even greater secrecy calling for research and development of atomic energy in
complete secrecy and established state ownership of all relevant raw materials,
particularly uranium and thorium.313 The Assembly engaged in a debate on the secret
nature of the project and the need for such a rigid state monopoly when the project’s
declared ambitions was to provide for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Act’s
only forceful critic, Krishnamurthy Rao, questioned Nehru: “May I know if secrecy is
insisted upon even for research for peaceful purposes ? In the Bill passed in the
United Kingdom secrecy is restricted only for defense purposes.” Nehru’s intentions
for a dual-purposed nuclear project was made clear when he replied: “I do not know
how you are to distinguish between the two [peaceful and military].”314

Bhabha - The Scientist:
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Both Nehru and Bhabha shared almost identical views on nuclear energy.
They both shared a considerable fascination with nuclear energy for overall national
development and also recognized the political value of nuclear weapons.315 Bhabha,
like Nehru, whom he first met in 1937, “accepted the looming view that mastery over
the energy potential in the atomic nucleus represented the apogee of science. The
colonial British regime had purposely retarded Indian industrial development, but
Nehru and Bhabha envisioned that Indian science would overcome this legacy and
achieve the highest symbols of modernity.”316
However, while Nehru reflected openly his mistrust of superpower-directed
international security regimes and advocated a balanced and controlled nuclear
disarmament, Bhabha mistrusted both superpowers and disarmament as a strategy.317
Bhabha was the scion of a wealthy Parsi family, a person who is known, like Nehru,
to have combined Western tastes and attitudes with a nationalistic determination to
raise India’s rank in the world.318 The two men shared similar backgrounds and
enjoyed good rapport: “both were born to wealth and influence, Cambridge educated,
connoisseurs of culture, and world-class in knowledge, ability and outlook. Bhabha, a
lifelong bachelor, and Nehru, a widower, devoted their time and energies to
achievement with few distractions. In many ways, the Nehru-Bhabha relationship
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constituted the only potentially real mechanism to check and balance the nuclear
program. Yet, rather than being watchful and balancing, the relationship appears to
have been friendly and symbiotic.”319 In fact, Bhabha seemed to have been the
scientific counterpart of Nehru – the politician. Perkovich writes about Bhabha:
“He favored Western dress, enjoyed deep friendships with leading British and continental
European scientists and partook of Viennese Opera whenever he could. At the same time
he negotiated defiantly and confidently with Western representatives to overcome the
legacy of colonialism and elevate Indian science to the world stage. As a former protégé
in the Atomic Energy Commission recalled: ‘Bhabha displayed none of the diffidence
that many Indians felt in front of White men. This was inspiring to many of us.’” 320

Bhabha was known to have favored the nuclear option and firmly believed in
nuclear weapons and their essential role in achieving national security. In a farreaching presentation to the 12th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
held in India in January 27- February 1, 1964, Bhabha maintained that “to achieve
absolute deterrence it was essential to have nuclear weapons; if one had them, the
other side’s overkill capacity did not matter. Second, with conventional weapons, it
was only possible to acquire a position of relative deterrence.”321 Furthermore, to
quote Bhabha: “If two countries, one possessing nuclear weapons and the other
without them, were to be permitted to fight out a war by themselves without any
intervention by third parties, the possession of nuclear weapons might be decisive.”322
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Bhabha’s central role in the genesis and growth of India’s civil and military
nuclear program, enabled him to occupy the most preeminent position among India’s
nuclear decision-makers. In fact, Mitchell Reiss argued that the responsibility “for
India’s nuclear development can be traced to one individual, Homi Bhabha.”323 From
the initial acquisition of research reactors, to the initial deployment of a Canadianbuilt reactor, to the development of a plutonium processing plant in Trombay,
Bhabha’s role was manifested.324 Furthermore, his well-timed interventions helped to
produce the atomic bomb. He is known to have persuaded Prime Minister Shastri to
approve work on a nuclear weapons option sometime during 1965. Immediately after
learning from the United States of the imminence of the Chinese nuclear test in 1964,
Bhabha called for a press conference to announce “India’s ability to produce a
nuclear bomb in eighteen months” adding that China’s nuclear capability demanded a
commensurate Indian response.325 Days later, he challenged the economic argument
against the nuclear bombs. Citing figures produced at the Third International
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Bhabha claimed that a 10 kiloton
bomb would cost $368,000 and a two megaton bomb would cost $680,000, adding
that “atomic explosives were some twenty times cheaper than conventional
explosives.”326
323
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Nevertheless, the critical period after the death of Nehru in 1964 was marred
by a great deal of ambiguity as to what the Indian nuclear and political establishment
was doing. As politicians throughout India pressed the case for building the bomb,
Prime Minister Shastri is known to have been against producing the bomb. In the Lok
Sabha debate after the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, Shastri responded: “We have to
consider the question from a practical angle. What will we gain by manufacturing the
atomic bomb; how far it would be able to increase our strength…..and what burden
will it impose on the country ?”327 He further responded to a written query in the Lok
Sabha by declaring that “despite the continued threat from China…..the government
has continued to adhere to the decision not to go in for nuclear weapons but to work
for their elimination instead.”328
During the same period, in an article based on an interview with Bhabha, the
New York Times journalist Anthony Lukas reported rumors that “Prime Minister
Shastri may have given the nuclear agency permission to work up to a point about
three months short of exploding a device, after which it would have to halt and await
a political decision before completing the rest of the work.”329 In this interview,
however, Bhabha said that “we are still 18 months away from exploding either a
bomb or a device for peaceful purposes and we are doing nothing to reduce that
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period.” Perkovich interprets comments made by Bhabha and Lukas as an affirmation
that Bhabha had been authorized to work on a nuclear explosion and that the delay in
producing it was “not due to policy but unmet technological requirements.”330 Kapur
also seems to reaffirm this view by suggesting that Bhabha seemed to have won over
both L.K. Jha, Shastri’s principle secretary, and Shastri himself.331 In November
1965, Bhabha put forward a note on a need for a subterranean nuclear explosion
project (SNEP). In December, Shastri approved the proposal, allowing research to be
undertaken up to a point “where, once the go-ahead signal was given, it would take
three months to have the explosion.”332 Shastri’s decision could be seen as a
compromise with the pro-bomb members of the Congress party and the IAEC
leadership.333
However, in 1966, both Shastri and Bhabha died. This led to important
leadership transitions with Indira Ghandi assuming the position of Prime Minister.
Vikram Sarabhai was chosen by Ghandi as the Head of the Atomic Energy
Commission in succession to Bhabha. The importance of the worldviews of decisionmakers becomes very important in this regard, because Sarabhai vehemently opposed
the development of nuclear weapons, neglecting the political and psychological boost
that the detonation of a nuclear explosion would have, and ordered a halt to all
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research on SPNE. In his first press conference after taking charge of the nuclear
establishment, Sarabhai sought to devalue the putative benefits of nuclear weapons
for India:
“I would like to emphasize that security can be endangered not only from outside but also
from within. If you do not maintain the rate of progress of the economic development of
the nation, I would suggest that you would face a most serious crisis, something that
might disintegrate India as we know it…..If you want to rely on the atomic bomb for
safeguarding your security….this is not achieved by exploding a bomb. It means a total
defense system, a means of delivery….you have to think in terms of long range missiles,
radars, a high state of electronics, a high state of metallurgical and industrial base…It
requires a total commitment of national resources of a most stupendous magnitude…..I
think India should view this whole question in relation to the sacrifice it is willing to
make, viewing it in its totality. I fully agree with the Prime Minister…..when she says
that an atomic bomb explosion will not help our security. I fully share this feeling.” 334

Sarabhai’s actions and statements marked a total deviation from Bhabha’s
stance on nuclear weapons. Many leading scientists and staunch pro-bomb advocates
in the IAEC, such as senior members Raja Ramanna and Homi Sethna, opposed
Sarabhai’s actions. Both nuclear advocates maintained that Sarabhai’s decision was
due to his “fundamental distaste towards nuclear weapons,” and Ramanna suggested
that Sarabhai’s decisions were done without the full knowledge of Mrs. Ghandi:
“When Mrs. Ghandi came to BARC (the Atomic Energy Establishment) she saw
things, we showed her around, but she may not have understood what was going
on.”335 With the death of Sarabhai at the end of 1971, and with Homi Sethna’s
assumption of the leadership of the IAEC, India’s nuclear weapons program was set
back on track and work on the subterranean peaceful nuclear explosion (SPNE)
commenced undisturbed. As Ramanna put it: “After Vikram Sarabhai’s death in
334
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1971, India began to seriously consider conducting a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion.”336
Concerning the 1974 decision to detonate the nuclear device, no “authoritative public
chronology exists of Indian decision-making regarding the 1974 explosion. Indeed,
according to two of the few officials who participated in the decision-making process,
written records of policy deliberations were not kept.”337 In an interview, Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission explained: “there was not a scrap of paper on
it.”338

Bureaucratic Politics & India’s Nuclear Decision-Making
The previous section attempted to illustrate the role that the worldview and
general input of India’s nuclear decision-makers had on the country’s nuclear
program. However, one must also consider the fact that the leaders of India’s Atomic
Energy Commission are not only behaving according to their attitudinal prisms but
also in their position as leaders of key scientific establishments. In this regard, one
could view Bhabha’s relentless attempts for the development of nuclear weapons by
deploying various tactics, from the encouragement of extreme perceptions of foreign
threats to the propagation of excessively optimistic cost estimates, as an attempt to
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increase dependence on his organization and to keep money and prestige flowing to
his scientific establishment.339
In fact, in order to illustrate that bureaucratic interests played some role,
Abraham mentions that the excessive attention and funding given to the atomic
energy program had “raised the ire of Indian scientists excluded from this cash cow,
some of whom were well known and powerful enough potentially to cast doubt on the
whole enterprise.”340 This was clearly the case with the Palit Professor of Physics at
Calcutta University, Meghnad Saha, whose relationship with Nehru predated that of
Bhabha by more than a decade. Moreover, his position as member of National
Planning Committee in pre-independence India, supposedly gave him more influence
than Bhabha.341 Furthermore, at the time of Bhabha’s return to India during the
Second World War and the consolidation of close ties between Bhabha and Nehru,
the Indian physics community had split into two factions: the ‘Calcutta-Allahabad’
axis dominated by Saha and his students, and the Bangalore group, lead by Nobel
Laureate C.V.Raman. Saha’s dislike for Raman would soon extend to Bhabha due to
the latter’s close rapport with Nehru. Saha had become “the most vocal critic of the
IAEC’s activities as soon as he realized that he would be excluded from the country’s
atomic energy institution.”342 Eventually however, Nehru and Bhabha managed to
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diffuse public criticism and went on to develop India’s nuclear infrastructure
shielding it from public scrutiny whenever they can. This came as a serious blow to
Saha as his institute, the Institute for Nuclear Physics in Calcutta, which was
eventually marginalized.343
Another instance that could be explained by bureaucratic theory is the position
of the Indian military on nuclear weapons. The military establishment was excluded
from the national security decision-making process in India. This was due to the fact
that India’s early leaders, fearing the potential of military coups influenced by the
British legacy, worked to subordinate the military to civilian rule.344 Nevertheless, the
Indian military, has shown very little enthusiasm for nuclear weapons in the first
place. This was basically due to the “simple fear that a nuclear weapons program
would mushroom into something costly, drawing funds from conventional weapons
which for the moment seem more urgent.”345 The opinion of the Indian military,
albeit uninfluential, implies that it was sensitive to bureaucratic concerns manifested
in budget allocations.
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Conclusions
The Indian case of proliferation is quite intriguing because it tends to
complicate our understanding of the reasons behind key nuclear decisions. Moreover,
it tends to challenge the conventional wisdom on proliferation which argues that
proliferation is solely caused by security threats. This chapter reflected that
multicausality as opposed to security threats on their own, have pushed India down
the nuclear track. In this regard, the security framework that has been employed in
this chapter suggested that India’s decision to ‘go nuclear’ was a reaction to systemic
and sub-systemic threats. In other words, the Indian decision to proliferate was due to
the Chinese threat manifested in border incursions and nuclear tests, the Pakistani
threat which was reflected in its leading role in the Kashmir insurgency, its relentless
quest for nuclear weapons, and its collaboration with China. Furthermore, the Indian
nuclear program sought to address, what New Delhi perceived as American
encroachment on its sovereignty manifested in its biased proliferation policies and its
intervention in regional conflicts.
Despite the role of the security perspective in linking India’s decision to the
strategic environment in which it operates, it seems that those previously mentioned
security threats served only as catalysts to already existing pro-bomb trends among
the prominent members of the Indian elite. This is evidenced by the fact that long
before India faced any overwhelming security threat, both Bhabha and Nehru thought
of the dual-uses of nuclear energy – i.e. for peace and war. Furthermore, there was no
consensus within the Indian elite on whether a bomb should be built or not. Surely,
the accumulation of security threats tended to increase the number of pro-bomb
advocates within the Indian elite. Nevertheless, if it was not for Bhabha’s well-timed

125

interventions and Nehru’s approval it is very unlikely that India would have been able
to pursue its nuclear dreams.
In this regard, the cognitive ‘lens’ seems the most useful in explaining India’s
decision to proliferate. This is due to its ability to link India’s decision to proliferate
with its domestic environment by examining the worldviews of its key decisionmakers which is of profound importance for understanding Indian nuclear politics.
Moreover, the cognitive approach to decision-making was able to add dynamism to
the static security explanation, by enabling one to map India’s progress on the nuclear
field over time through the examination of leadership transitions and the effect of
different worldviews on India’s nuclear developments. This chapter has clearly
illustrated that the death of both Bhabha and Nehru and the rise of anti-bomb elites
such as Sarabhai and Shastri dealt a serious blow to India’s nuclear program.
However, Ghandi’s assumption of premiership along with Ramanna and Sethna, as
pro-bomb heads of the IAEC, lead to the revitalization of India’s nuclear program and
eventually gave way to the PNE of 1974. In addition, the cognitive approach shed
light on important normative issues such as ‘prestige’ and ‘science’ and related them
to the worldviews of decision-makers. In this light, the Indian nuclear program could
be seen not only as a response to security threats but also as the ultimate culmination
of elite identification of nuclear weapons as symbols of post-colonial modernity and
successful state-building.
The bureaucratic approach adds to our understanding of the Indian case,
through its ability to further open the ‘black-box’ of the nation-state by allowing one
to investigate institutional conflicts that took place in India’s nuclear politics. It also
served another important function which is to put decision-makers within their proper
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institutional framework and recognized that they had their own bureaucratic and
personal incentives. In this regard, Bhabha’s ability to overcome bureaucratic dissent
and override his scientific opponents proved critical to the initiation of India’s nuclear
weapons program. In fact, some cite Bhabha’s widely optimistic claims that India
could develop the bomb in 18 months and that an arsenal of 50 atomic bombs would
cost less than $21 million, as evidence of his interest in furthering the bureaucratic
interests of his organization.346 On balance, however, it seems that the worldviews of
heads of the IAEC, had much more effect on their decisions in comparison to their
bureaucratic and personal concerns. For example, despite bureaucratic theory’s
assumption that decision-makers will tend to take decisions that will increase
dependence on their institution, due to his personal anti-bomb sentiments (and not his
institutional interests), Vikram Sarabhai, as head of IAEC, worked to slow down
India’s progress in the nuclear field.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis was an attempt to understand the reasons behind Israel and India’s
decision to acquire nuclear weapons and their preferred nuclear strategies. Moreover,
it sought to “theorize” the largely descriptive, but undertheorized literature on those
two proliferation cases, by employing several “levels of analysis” and hence more
accurately conceptualize the process of nuclear decision-making in Israel and India.
In essence, this research through its multivariate analysis and conceptual rigor, sought
to address some of the major problems of proliferation literature as Peter Lavoy put it:
“More problematic than the lack of reliable information about new and emerging nuclearweapon states, however, is the dearth of carefully specified explanations of nuclear
proliferation. The existing literature on the sources of proliferation is more rich than
rigorous. Even the best case studies produce few enduring insights into general
proliferation patterns…..Predictive and explanatory models, however, cannot be
constructed through induction alone; there are too many variables that can influence the
process of arms acquisition.”347

The multilevel analysis employed, emphasized the importance of security
concerns within the context of each state’s threat perceptions and stressed on the need
for complementing the security approach with two other decision-making models ;
the cognitive approach with its emphasis on attitudinal prisms and worldviews of
decision-makers in relation to important normative constructs such as “prestige” and
“science”; and the bureaucratic perspective with its emphasis on institutional infighting and power-seeking bureaucrats.
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The intention of this multilevel approach was to reduce the recurrent tendency
to emphasize security motives at the expense of other variables, by illustrating the
merits of other approaches and how each approach explained a portion of reality
which the other one failed to explain. Consequently, a more comprehensive outlook
was achieved and a much more detailed picture emerged for the reasons for nuclear
proliferation and the dynamics of nuclear decision-making.

Moreover, this

innovative approach helped to bridge the gap between international relations and
foreign policy decision-making by illustrating the necessity of having both work side
by side to further our empirical endeavors.
After studying each case study separately, this chapter will serve an
integrative utility by comparing the Israeli and Indian cases of nuclear proliferation.
This comparative analysis will take place on both a conceptual level, in relation to the
theoretical models employed, and on an empirical level, as it relates to the particular
details of each case study. Finally, the Israeli and Indian cases of proliferation will be
compared to other cases of Third World proliferation and non-proliferation in order to
ascertain whether those two cases are “generalizable” or not.
The Israeli and Indian cases of proliferation, suggest that security was, to
different degrees, a necessary but insufficient cause for proliferation to occur. A
multitude of factors entered into the nuclear politics of both countries and ultimately
culminated in a situation where the decision to “go nuclear” was an outcome of
several variables all of which contributed, in one way or another, to that ultimate
decision. The degree each factor influenced the nuclear decision in any country is
largely related to the domestic and systemic environment within which each country
found itself. In the case of Israel, security was much more of an important factor in its
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decision to develop nuclear weapons than India. This is due to the former’s
overwhelming and pervasive sense of insecurity manifested in the prospect of
annihilation that it has faced since it was first implanted in the Middle East. On the
other hand, India was also faced with innumerable security threats from the US,
China and Pakistan, but those threats did not directly threaten the physical survival of
India or present it with the specter of annihilation. This illustrates that the security
factor in nuclear proliferation becomes more predominant when states face severe
security threats that seemingly cannot be addressed without nuclear weapons. Israel
sought to end the threat of annihilation which it faced and impose its acceptance on
its Arab neighbors. The lack of an overwhelming security threat to India, gave way to
a situation where the psychological predispositions of its chief ‘nuclear myth-makers’
played a more predominant role in nuclear politics. Pro-bomb advocates such as
Bhabha, Ramanna, Sethna and Nehru played crucial roles, since their dedication and
relentless efforts to make the nuclear project work, eventually proved critical amidst a
divided Indian elite.348 Hence, in the Indian case, one could think of security as a
secondary factor, acting as a ‘catalyst’ and serving to bolster already existing pronuclear trends among that country’s scientific-political elite – trends that were part of
that country’s drive for post-colonial modernity and emerged long before any security
threats materialized.
On the other hand, the predominance of the security factor in the Israel case,
lead to the emergence of a near-consensus among the Israeli elite on the issue of

348

Despite the fact that India’s nuclear decision-making is extremely secretive and involves very few

people, an interesting debate took place only once in India on the issue of nuclear weapons. This was in
the aftermath of the Chinese test in 1964. See Frank E. Couper, “Indian Party Conflict on the Issue of
Atomic Weapons,” The Journal of Developing Areas 3 (January 1969) : 191-206.

131

‘keeping the nuclear option open’. This was an asset for their nuclear advocates, since
they managed to overcome internal dissent with relative ease in comparison to their
Indian counterparts. However, there is no doubt that the development of Israel’s
nuclear weapons owes much to the presence of well-positioned nuclear advocates
such as Ben-Gurion, Perez, Bergmann, and Dayan who manipulated Israel’s domestic
and international situation for their purposes. In fact, the nuclear advocates in Israel
were essential in nuclear myth-making – the portrayal of nuclear weapons as the only
guaranteed and ultimate means of security. Hence, nuclear advocates were
responsible in pushing the program forward to become an actual reality. One must
note that members of the conventional school in Israeli politics argued for reliance on
conventional weapons and did not act to obstruct the nuclear project in any significant
way nor did they encourage it either. Consequently, had all of Israel’s scientificpolitical elites been conventionalists, Israel’s weapons program might never have
been established.
The role of bureaucratic politics was very important in both the Indian and
Israeli cases of proliferation. In fact, the bureaucratic model of decision-making
worked to put decision-makers within their institutional context and illustrate the
pulling and hauling which is characteristic of bureaucratic politics. In both cases,
chief bureaucrats residing over key scientific establishments played a major role in
the decision to build nuclear weapons by pacifying their bureaucratic opponents and
overcoming their dissent. In this regard, the roles of Homi Bhabha of India and Ernest
David Bergmann of Israel were of extreme importance in terms of their ability to
monopolize the scientific institutions necessary for producing the bomb.
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However, according to bureaucratic theory, decision-makers pursue policies
that increase dependence on their organizations. Nevertheless, one could find chief
bureaucrats pursuing policies that reflect their own personal predispositions and
ideosyncracies and not necessarily the mainstream interests of their organization. For
instance, despite the Israeli military’s known preference for reliance on conventional
weapons, Moshe Dayan moved his country’s nuclear program from an unexercised
option to an actual ‘bomb in the basement’ during his position as Minister of Defense
in Golda Meir’s cabinet.349 In some other instances, bureaucrats occupying the same
position might pursue different policies due to their different worldviews. When
Vikram Sarabhai was head of the IAEC, India’s nuclear program stalled due to his
personal disdain for nuclear weapons. However, when pro-bomb advocates such as
Bhabha, Sethna, or Ramanna occupied the same position, India’s nuclear program
was furthered. Hence, it is safe to say that in both countries, in terms of the reasons
for nuclear proliferation, bureaucratic politics were much less important than security
or cognitive factors.
In terms of nuclear decision-making, both countries reflect a very tight
decision-making structure that involves a very small number of decision-makers who
take their decisions in secret. In both cases, the role of the Prime Minister and the
Head of the Atomic Energy Commission were of utmost importance. In this sense,
one could speak of an elitist decision-making structure that operates in the form of a
“government within a government”.
For the period under study, both India and Israel chose opacity as their
preferred nuclear posture. This illustrates sensitivity to international pressures lead by
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the superpowers to limit proliferation and awareness of the biases inherent in the
international system towards new proliferators. However, whereas Israel has
maintained this posture to date, India has adopted a more overt nuclear posture which
became apparent in the aftermath of its PNE of 1974 and again recently in the tests
which took place in May 1998. Indian nuclear testing is largely due to the ‘prestige’
factor which is much more prevalent in its case of proliferation, as opposed to that of
Israel in which such a factor is absent. This factor was clear in the worldview of
India’s chief decision-makers who saw nuclear weapons as prestigious tools of
national security and symbols of modernity and successful post-colonial state
building. Moreover, an Israeli public display of nuclear prowess manifested in an
overt posture or a nuclear test might have jeopardized its security by encouraging a
number of its larger neighboring Arab and Muslim states to seek nuclear weapons as
a result of an increased domestic pressure on their regimes to build such weapons. In
this regard, Israel’s posture of ‘deterrence through ambiguity’ and opaque
proliferation proved very useful.
The security model was very useful in explaining the multitude of purposes
that Israel’s nuclear weapons could be used for. In fact, for the period under study,
Israel demonstrated an elaborate understanding of the specific strategic utilities of
nuclear weapons and contemplated a wide range of nuclear strategies. As previously
mentioned, Israeli strategists contemplated the use of nuclear weapons for
compellence, deterrence (proportionate and cumulative), war-making (using tactical
nuclear weapons on the battlefield or large scale nuclear attacks on population
centers), or securing political benefits in negotiations by playing the nuclear card. On
the other hand, in the Indian case, there was no elaborate identification of specific
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nuclear strategies and a great deal of ‘ad-hoc’ strategic thinking that mostly circulated
around the ‘prestige’ of acquiring nuclear weapons and conducting nuclear tests. In
fact, throughout the period under study, India adopted a form of ‘crude deterrence’
and still had not developed a military strategy or operational plans for nuclear
weapons.350 This situation changed as late as 1985 when Rajiv Ghandi first formed a
small group, including Ramanna and K. Subrahmanyam, to consider India’s defense
planning needs.351 In essence, the cognitive model was very useful in accounting for
the ad-hocism centered around prestige that was characteristic of India’s strategic
thinking. Moreover, this pattern of strategic thinking coincides with the worldview of
pro-bomb advocates in India – those who saw India’s nuclear weapons as serving a
prestige function. In fact, the prestige factor in India’s nuclear testing and the
country’s lack of a well-established strategic doctrine with regards to the specific uses
of nuclear weapons was both recognized and criticized by the anti-bomb leader of the
IAEC, Vikram Sarabhai: “those who have studied military strategy would also agree
that paper tigers do not provide security…..if you want to rely on the atomic bomb for
safeguarding your security in the sense that say the US or the USSR have got, a series
of balanced deterrents; this is not achieved by exploding the bomb.”352
On a normative level, it seemed clear that the desire for ‘scientific
achievement’ played an important role in the worldview of both Israeli and Indian
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decision-makers. This perception of nuclear weapons as possessing some intrinsic
normative significance, could be the result of what Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
Sikkink call, the diffusion of “prominence norms” in the international system.353 In
other words, “norms held by states widely viewed as successful” are likely to diffuse
internationally and act as models for emulation by other states. Israel and India saw
the West as technologically and scientifically advanced and one of the ultimate
manifestations of this was their possession of nuclear weapons. Hence, for the chief
decision-makers in both states, it was science that brought the West to its current
stage of development and therefore they worked to emulate this scientific
achievement by manufacturing nuclear weapons for themselves. For example, BenGurion referred to the atomic revolution as “an unprecedented transformation of the
history of civilization,” and in relation to American achievement in the nuclear field,
he suggested that “what Einstein, Oppenheimer and Teller…..made for the United
States, could also be done by scientists in Israel.”354 The perception of science as
synonymous to post-colonial modernity was also clear in Nehru’s worldview: “I
firmly believe that is through the method and spirit of science that we can ultimately
solve our problems.”355 For Nehru, “India became colonized because of its lack of
technological sophistication.”356
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On the other hand, the Indians added another normative component to nuclear
weapons by not only thinking of them as representing the hallmark of scientific
achievement but also referring to them as tools of much-needed prestige after a long
colonial heritage – a feature which was absent in the Israeli case. It is noted that when
India conducted its nuclear test in 1974, the Indian Express reported that “India’s
nuclear blast has catapulted her into the front rank of nations. No longer is she
dismissed as a ‘pitiful giant’.”357 The Economic Times recorded that the Indian people
now felt ‘inches taller’.358 While India needed a demonstration of prestige by
detonating a nuclear device, Israeli decision-makers did not contemplate such a
necessity in their nuclear calculations. Note Ben-Gurion’s statement in this regard:
“No other people is superior to us in its intellectual prowess.”359
In relation to other cases of proliferation and non-proliferation in the Third
World, the Indian and Israeli cases and the theoretical models associated with them
are very instructive. In fact, both cases can provide a tentative typology with which to
judge the relative weight of security, cognitive, and bureaucratic factors in the
movement towards nuclear proliferation in other developing countries. First, in order
to assess the reasons for nuclear proliferation in any given country, an understanding
of the strategic threats that are faced by that country must be established. Second, an
examination of the time and sequence in which those countries developed nuclear
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weapons and how that relates to their strategic threat perceptions is of extreme
importance. In other words, did the country in question embark upon a nuclear
weapons program before or after its security was seriously challenged? The Indian
case illustrated that when countries start to think of nuclear weapons before serious
strategic threats have mushroomed, this entails that ‘nuclear myth-making’ and the
quest for prestige are supreme. Third, one must also look at elite divisiveness on the
issue of nuclear weapons within the decision-making structure. As the case of Israel
suggested, the relative cohesiveness of the political-scientific elite on the nuclear
issue, indicates that the security factor should be given more weight in relation to
other factors leading to nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, the Indian case
illustrated that when elite divisiveness is great, one must go beyond security and
examine other variables such as well-timed interventions by key nuclear myth-makers
or bureaucratic politics, since, in such a case, they could be more important than
security as facilitators of proliferation. Fourth, the dynamic process of institutional
competition must be recognized. In other words, what institutions are there to gain (or
to lose) from nuclear weapons acquisitions? How do they play their differences and
overcome bureaucratic dissent? The Israeli and Indian cases illustrated that success in
monopolizing scientific institutions is crucial in the development of nuclear weapons.
Fifth, the depth of strategic thinking on nuclear strategy, in any given country, must
be examined. One could infer from the Indian case that the presence of ‘ad-hocism’ in
nuclear strategy and the absence of an elaborate strategic doctrine governing the use
of nuclear weapons indicates that the most likely motivation behind the acquisition of
nuclear weapons is not security but prestige. On the other hand, the Israeli case
suggested that the security factor is predominant since a well thought-out nuclear
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doctrine is due to careful strategic planning and sound appreciation of security
threats.
Some of the factors stated above might be useful in tentatively evaluating the
reasons for proliferation or non-proliferation in selected countries. The case of South
Africa and its decision to abandon its nuclear option may have been due to changes in
the country’s strategic environment and in the worldviews of its decision-makers
caused by leadership transitions. President F.W. de Klerk declared to a special joint
session of the South African parliament on March 24, 1993, that “at one stage South
Africa did develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability,” but “early in 1990 final
effect was given to decisions that all the nuclear devices should be dismantled and
destroyed.”360 The end to South Africa’s nuclear program was due to security factors
manifested in the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independence of Namibia, the
cessation of hostilities in Angola, and the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from
that country. Moreover, the end of apartheid and the election of De Klerk as president
in September 1989 precipitated this change in strategy.361 This exemplified the role
that leadership transitions and worldviews of decision-makers has on any country’s
nuclear program. Moreover, on the bureaucratic front, one has to note the role that
important institutions played in nuclear decision-making in South Africa. In this
regard, it is worth mentioning that all decisions were taken unanimously by the head
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of government in consultation with relevant cabinet ministers, the chief of the
Defense Force and the chief executive of the atomic energy program.362
Similarly, the Pakistani case of nuclear proliferation may have been due to
security concerns, well-positioned nuclear advocates, and competent bureaucracies
and their accompanying interests. In terms of security concerns, Pakistan’s nuclear
program was intended to deter India – its much larger and militarily superior neighbor
– from launching a conventional or a nuclear attack on Pakistan and to defend
Pakistani territory should deterrence fail.363 Pakistan’s efforts to acquire and develop
nuclear weapons were launched by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in January
1972 and the program was being administered by Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman, Munir Ahmed Khan. Nevertheless, if it was not for the pivotal role that
Abdul Qadeer Khan, nuclear advocate and Pakistan’s chief scientist, played,
Pakistan’s program might never have been established. Khan lead a massive
clandestine international procurement effort to acquire necessary components,
material, and machinery to assemble the centrifuge enrichment plant at Kahuta, east
of Islamabad.364 Officially, launched under Khan’s control in July 1976 and named
the Engineering Research Laboratories (Project 706), Kahuta became central to the
Pakistani nuclear weapon program.365 Due to his efforts and relentless dedication,

362

Ibid., 102.

363

Betts, “Incentives for Nuclear Weapons,” 1058-1059.

364

Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb ,196.

365

Ibid.

139

Abdul Qadeer Khan is known as the ‘father’ of the Pakistani bomb.366 On the
bureaucratic front, the competition between Khan’s laboratories and the Pakistani
Atomic Energy Commission played a crucial role in Pakistan’s weapons program.
Each organization was developing its own missile systems and competing for funding
and political authority to conduct tests.367 Also, the military – as an institution – was
important in Pakistani nuclear decision-making especially during the periods where
the country was ruled by a military government.368
Both the South African and Pakistani cases illustrate, once again, that nuclear
decisions require the presence of a multitude of factors. In this regard, security
concerns, worldviews of decision-makers and the presence of competent
bureaucracies for the implementation of nuclear decisions, become critical features of
any country’s nuclear program.
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